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Abstract:   
This dissertation studies the impacts of renewable portfolio standard (RPS) regulation on 
regional electricity markets, and the backup capacity coordination mechanisms between 
renewable and conventional power suppliers with tradable green certificate (TGC) 
offering. 
 
Firstly, we consider a regional market with renewable capacity and access to the TGC 
market. We establish a monopoly model and a duopoly model. We find that the green 
power output decreases when the RPS percentage increases in a regional market. When 
the TGC price increases, the green power output increases, and the total profit first 
decreases then increases. There exists an optimal RPS percentage to maximize the social 
welfare. By numerical analysis, we show that when the TGC price increases, the 
electricity outputs change slower in the duopoly market. 
 
Secondly, we study a capacity coordination mechanism in a single region market. The 
intermittent nature of the renewable supplier results in random power shortage. Though a 
conventional supplier can prepare backup capacity to cover the shortage, there is no 
commitment that enough backup capacity will be prepared without any incentives to the 
conventional supplier. We design a coordination mechanism where the renewable 
supplier offers the conventional supplier free TGC proportional to the backup capacity. 
This mechanism coordinates the conventional supplier's decision on backup capacity and 
arbitrarily splits the system profit between the two suppliers by the wholesale price. 
 
Thirdly, we design a coordination mechanism in a two-regional market with interregional 
transmission. The renewable suppliers offer TGC and pay transmission premium to 
encourage the conventional suppliers prepare enough backup capacities. The 
conventional suppliers decide the interregional transmission prices between them. This 
mechanism coordinates the system and achieves the global optimum. In contrast, an 
uncoordinated baseline case leads to under investment of backup capacity and the system 
profit is less than the global optimum. In the coordination model, when the transmission 
cost increases, the backup capacity in a region increases if this region is a net importer of 
backup power, or decreases if it is a net exporter.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
The increase of renewable penetration has been a signicant trend in many regional
electricity markets in U.S. (Mai et al. (2014)). Though the renewable (green) sources
are more environmentally friendly, the generation costs are higher than the conven-
tional (black) sources such as coal and natural gas. For example, Heal (2010) estimates
that the capital cost of oshore wind power is $4000 per kilowatt while for coal it is
from $1700 to $1900 per kilowatt.
To promote the growth of renewable energy generation, more than 30 states in
the U.S. have established the renewable portfolio standard (RPS) regulations in their
electricity markets. In a power market under the RPS regulation, a certain percent-
age of electricity must be from renewable sources, and such percentage may increase
gradually per year. For example, Illinois sets a 25% target with mandatory RPS
regulation to be reached by 2025, and New Mexico sets a 20% target to be reached by
2020 (Tamas et al. (2010)). Facing the RPS regulation, the power suppliers establish
markets of tradable green certicate (TGC), which allow the renewable suppliers sell
their extra TGC to the conventional suppliers, as the latter cannot meet the RPS
requirement by their own generation.
The impacts of RPS regulation can be examined in both the strategic level and
the tactic level. Strategic analysis focuses on the design and evaluation of RPS reg-
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ulation mechanics, its inuence on the power industry of a state, a nation or wider
geographic area in long term. Tactic analysis focuses on the rms' behavior facing
the RPS regulation, such as production quantity decision, pricing policy, coordina-
tion contract, and merging. We conduct our research at the tactic level, to study the
impacts of RPS regulation on regional electricity markets in Chapter 4.
In addition, with the fast growth of renewable power, the intermittent nature of
the renewable energy sources becomes a threat to the stability of the power gird. The
power outputs from two major renewable sources, wind and solar power, are not as
stable and controllable as the conventional sources (Sovacool (2009)). Therefore, in
regional electricity markets with high renewable penetration, the risk of power short-
age is signicant.
To solve this problem, one option is to adopt energy storage service. Unfortu-
nately, large scale installations of energy storage are still expensive based on the
current technologies (Beaudin et al. (2010)), and thus it is unrealistic to rely on en-
ergy storage capacity to cover all the power shortage caused by intermittent renewable
power outputs.
Another option is to buy backup power from the balancing markets (Vandezande
et al. (2010)), which are operated by many regional independent system operators
(ISO). The renewable suppliers predict and propose their demands (power shortages)
for a future time period. The conventional suppliers bid to fulll the demands, and
their oers form a stairwise supply-price curve (Figure 1.1). These suppliers oering
the lowest prices win the deal and provide the power up to their respective capacities.
Though the above mechanism can help to mitigate the power shortage, it cannot be
guaranteed that the balancing markets can always provide enough low-price power
2
supply to fully cover the shortage, due to the uncertainty of both supply side and
demand side. Therefore, many regional electricity markets still need dedicated backup
capacities to buer the renewable generation.
Figure 1.1: The Stairwise Supply-Price Curve in Balancing Market
Gas-red power plants are suitable to serve as backup capacity, because they are
fast ramping and relatively easy to be turned on and o. This buering function of
gas power for the renewable power has been well discussed by recent literature such
as Hittinger et al. (2010) and Lee et al. (2012). Better thing is, the U.S. has ample
resource of natural gas, including the rising trend of commercial production of shale
gas (Krupnick et al. (2015)). In those regions with plenty of both renewable sources
and gas sources such as Texas, gas-red plants are built to rm the intermittent re-
newable generation. For example, the South Texas Electric Cooperative built up the
Pearsall Power Plant (202.5 megawatt) to provide backup power for their customers
in 65 counties where an increasing penetration of wind power brought challenges to
the grid stability.1
Most renewable suppliers outsource the backup power capacity they need from
conventional suppliers (Vandezande et al. (2010)), because of the dierence in the
generation technologies. However, when a renewable supplier and a conventional
1http://www.wartsila.com/en/gas-power-plant-to-south-texas-electric-cooperative
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supplier operate independently, there is no economic incentive for the conventional
supplier to build enough backup capacity for its competitor (Yang et al. (2012)). Fac-
ing high variability as backup power suppliers makes the fossil-fuel generators deviate
from their optimal operating points where the generation eciency is maximal, be-
cause they need respond to the electricity demand when the power shortage occurs.
Thus the conventional suppliers' prots will be negatively aected.
Therefore, incentives are needed to encourage the conventional suppliers to build
enough backup capacity to buer the intermittent renewable power output (Lee et al.
(2012)). In Chapter 5, we propose a coordination mechanism based on the TGC of-
fering. The core idea is to let the renewable suppliers oer TGC in return for backup
capacity committed by the conventional suppliers. The quantity of TGC is propor-
tional to the backup capacities prepared by the conventional suppliers. In this way,
the conventional suppliers will have incentives to prepare enough backup capacities
to cover the renewable suppliers' power shortages.
In the context of regional power markets with RPS regulation, we highlight two
advantages of oering TGC instead of paying money to facilitate the coordination.
Firstly, the TGC is a reliable and convenient asset for trading between the renewable
suppliers and the conventional suppliers, as the latter always need to outsource TGC
from the former to meet the RPS requirement. By a direct oering of TGC, both
parties save transaction cost charged by a third party broker (3% typically) when
they buy of sell TGC in the national market. Secondly, it is more nancially secure
to transfer TGC than monetary payment for both parties. From the renewable sup-
pliers' point of view, oering TGC eliminates the impact on their cash ows caused by
paying money, as TGC is a by-product of its daily operation. From the conventional
suppliers' point of view, the coordination mechanism provides a stable TGC source,
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which hedges the risk in the national TGC market due to the price uncertainty and
the supply uncertainty (Klessmann et al. (2010)).
During the development of renewable power and implementation of RPS regula-
tion, the interregional power transmission plays an important role, as many renewable
energy sources are far from major power consumers (Munoz et al. (2013)). In Chap-
ter 6, we examine the pooling eect, i.e., the power suppliers in dierent regions
share their backup capacities. Given the power transmission is economical, if power
shortage occurs in one region and it cannot be solely covered by the local backup
capacity, the other regions' power suppliers can transmit their extra backup power to
that region. And thus all the interconnected regions can benet from such resource
pooling practice.
In summary, our research can be categorized into three topics: impacts of the
RPS regulation on regional electricity markets, rms' coordination contract based
on tradable green certicate oering, and a capacity coordination mechanism taking
interregional transmission into consideration. The following sections demonstrate
overviews of the main results under the three topics.
1.2 Overview of Impacts of the Renewable Portfolio Standard on
Regional Electricity Markets
In Chapter 4, we study a regional electricity market served by one or two suppliers.
We analyze a monopoly market with one supplier and a duopoly market with two
suppliers to study the impacts of TGC price and RPS percentage on the green/black
energy outputs, the electricity price and the suppliers' prot.
We reveal the common properties of two structures. In a regional electricity mar-
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ket with TGC available from outside, the increase of local RPS percentage does not
guarantee an increase of local green output. Our analytical results indicate that the
green power output decreases when the RPS percentage increases in the regional
electricity market if the TGC price in the national market remains unchanged. In
contrast, a higher TGC price can eectively promote the local green power output.
A collective eort of increasing RPS percentage by many regions increases the overall
demand of TGC across the country, and the national TGC price will increase. In
summary, we suggest the regional regulators to set up their RPS development plans
carefully in a synchronized way.
We also compare the dierence between two structures with numerical analysis.
In the duopoly structure, the electricity price and suppliers' prots are lower, and
the total electricity supply is higher than in the monopoly structure. The electricity
outputs change slower when the TGC price increases in the duopoly structure than
in the monopoly structure. The monopoly supplier only needs to pay attention to
cost reduction and can respond rapidly; while the suppliers in the duopoly structure
need to be concerned with both cost reduction and keeping their market shares. To
maximize the social welfare, the optimal RPS percentage in the duopoly structure is
higher than in the monopoly structure.
1.3 Overview of Coordination Contract in Regional Electricity Market
Based on Tradable Green Certicate Oering
In Chapter 5, we study a coordination contract between a renewable supplier and a
conventional supplier in a regional electricity market. The energy sources of the re-
newable suppliers are intermittent and lead to random power shortage. To encourage
the conventional supplier to build backup capacity to cover the shortage, we design
a coordination contract where the renewable supplier oers the conventional supplier
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free tradable green certicate proportional to the backup capacity. The renewable
supplier decides the TGC oering rate and the wholesale price of backup power, and
then the conventional supplier decides the quantity of backup capacity.
We prove the contract achieves the system coordination. The system prot can
be arbitrarily allocated between the two suppliers by adjusting the wholesale price.
We study a baseline case without coordination and prove the baseline case leads to
under investment of the backup capacity. By comparing to the baseline case, we nd
the coordination model can achieve Pareto improvement for both suppliers.
Sensitivity analysis is conducted on the impacts of following market conditions.
Firstly, when the xed cost increases, the backup capacity decreases and the TGC
oering rate increases. Both suppliers' prots decrease and the total prot decreases.
Secondly, when the electricity price increases or the variable cost decreases, the backup
capacity increases and the TGC oering rate decreases. Both suppliers' prots in-
crease and the total prot increases. Lastly, when the shortage cost increases, the
backup capacity increases and the TGC oering rate increases. The total prot de-
creases, the renewable supplier's prot decreases but the conventional supplier's prot
increases.
Social welfare analysis is conducted, and we nd that the social welfare of the co-
ordination structure will be greater than of the baseline case unless the environmental
damage of conventional power is extremely high.
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1.4 Overview of Capacity Coordination in Regional Electricity Markets
with Interregional Transmission
In Chapter 6, we study a capacity coordination mechanism between renewable suppli-
ers and conventional suppliers in regional electricity markets with interregional power
transmission. The renewable suppliers oer free tradable green certicates for backup
capacity reservation and pay transmission premiums to encourage the conventional
suppliers to prepare enough backup capacity. The renewable suppliers decide the
TGC oering rates and the transmission premiums, and the conventional suppliers
decide the power transmission prices and then the quantities of backup capacities.
We prove the above mechanism achieves the system coordination ,while the base-
line case without coordination leads to under investment of the backup capacity. We
show the coordination mechanism is robust, that if the TGC oering rate deviates
from the optimal point, the system prot will not decrease signicantly. Comparing
to the single region scenario without transmission in Chapter 5, the backup capacity
in a certain region will increase if that region is more possible to export backup power,
or decrease if it is more possible to import.
We conduct sensitivity analysis to nd the impacts of following market conditions.
Firstly, when the electricity price increases, both the total capacity and the TGC
oering rate increase. All suppliers' prots and the system prot increase. Secondly,
when the shortage cost increases, both the total capacity and the TGC oering rate
increase. The system prot and the renewable suppliers' prots decrease, but the
conventional suppliers' prots increase. Thirdly, when the xed cost increases, the
capacity in each region decreases while the TGC oering rate keeps the same. All
suppliers' prots and the system prot decrease. Fourthly, when the variable cost
increases, the total capacity decreases while the TGC oering rate increases. All
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suppliers' prots and the system prot decrease. Lastly, When the transmission cost
increases, the TGC oering rate keeps the same. The capacity in a region increases
(decreases) if this region is more possible to import (export) backup power. All
suppliers' prots and the system prot decrease.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Our research studies the impacts of RPS regulation on regional electricity markets,
rms' coordination contract based on TGC oering, and a capacity coordination
mechanism considering interregional transmission. In the following sections, we re-
view the three streams of literature related to our research.
2.1 Impacts of the Renewable Portfolio Standard on Electricity Markets
The RPS regulation attracts increasing attention from both practitioners and schol-
ars because it is reshaping the electricity industry fundamentally. The impacts of
RPS regulation on electricity markets are widely investigated by recent literature.
Kydes (2007) analyzes the impacts of imposing a 20% federal RPS policy on the US
energy markets by 2020. Such policy may be eective in promoting the adoption of
renewable generation technologies and reducing emissions. The electricity prices are
expected to rise about 3 percent since the generation costs are higher. Singh (2009)
proposes a national tradable renewable energy credits scheme in India, and they sug-
gest it would reduce the cost of compliance to a renewable portfolio obligation, and
encourage ecient resource utilizations and investments in appropriate technologies.
Verbruggen (2009) establishes a general framework of criteria to evaluate the perfor-
mance of renewable energy support policies and tests the framework with the data
from Flemish TGC support system. Wiser et al. (2011) study the design of and expe-
rience with state level RPS programs in the U.S. aimed to encourage a wider diversity
of renewable energy technologies, and solar energy in particular.
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These papers focus on the impacts of RPS regulation on the national-scale mar-
kets, while our research studies rms' decisions in a regional market under the RPS
regulation.
The research interest on rms' decisions in power markets with renewable pene-
tration, is increasing in recent years. Tamas et al. (2010) compare the oligopoly rm
decisions between feed-in-tari and TGC schemes, and perform numerical analysis us-
ing the UK data. Zhou and Tamas (2010) show that the RPS regulation may induce
mergers between the black and green generators. Such mergers enable the integrated
rms to extend market power from the TGC market to the electricity market. Fis-
cher (2010) analyzes price-taking rms in both electricity and TGC markets under
perfect competition. Amundsen and Bergman (2012) examine two scenarios on the
Nordic electricity market. In the rst scenario, both rms are Cournot oligopoly
players in electricity markets and price takers in TGC markets; in the second, both
rms are Cournot oligopoly players in the two markets. Tanaka and Chen (2013)
model dominant-fringe rms in a Stackelberg game to examine market power in both
electricity and TGC markets.
The above literature address a national electricity market or an international
market without external TGC supply, and the TGC trade is internalized between
suppliers. Our research diers from existing work by considering a regional electricity
market where the TGC trade is external.
In summary, the investigation of the impacts of RPS in regional electricity markets
with external TGC trade is still limited. Our research in Chapter 4 will ll the gap
in this area.
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2.2 Firms' Coordination Mechanisms in Electricity Markets with
Renewable Energy Penetration
Firms' coordination behavior in the electricity markets have been studied for a long
time. The recent rising of renewable power entices more research in this area, because
the intermittence nature of renewable energy sources requires more coordination be-
tween power suppliers. Andersen and Lund (2007) study how to integrate uctuating
renewable power supplies into power systems by using combined heat and power
plants as backup. They focus on the methodologies and computer tools necessary to
optimize the participants' market decisions. Klessmann et al. (2010) discuss three
coordination mechanisms, including transferring of TGC between regions, to assist
the European states to achieve the EU-wide RPS target of reaching 20% in 2020.
Milligan et al. (2010) evaluate the important factors to improve the power systems'
ability to absorb renewable generation. By studying the Eastern Interconnection
electricity markets of U.S., they show how large, responsive energy markets can help
the integration of renewable electricity. Vandezande et al. (2010) discuss the market
structure for backup power. They suggest a two-part payment, one for backup ca-
pacity and one for backup power, is appropriate to achieve a well-functioning market.
Lee et al. (2012) explore potential synergies of natural gas and renewable energy in
the U.S. electric power sector, and discuss market design issues that could benet
from collaborative engagement. Klinge Jacobsen et al. (2014) study the coordina-
tion mechanisms such as joint support schemes to achieve the EU renewable targets.
They show that by cost sharing and interregional transferring of green credits, the
renewable investment will become more ecient.
Though the above literature have discussed many aspects of coordination between
power suppliers, the investigation on coordination between renewable suppliers and
conventional suppliers based on TGC oering is still limited. In Chapter 5, we analyze
12
such coordination mechanism and provide insights to ll this void.
2.3 Renewable Power Transmission and General Goods Transshipment
Problems
Our research in Chapter 6 is related to the literature on power transmission problem
with renewable penetration. Schaber et al. (2012) show that in a regional electricity
market with high renewable penetration, the transmission grid expansion alleviates
the competition between the renewable and conventional suppliers and benets both
parties. Munoz et al. (2013) study the cost-eective investment policy for power
transmission infrastructure to meet the RPS regulation of many U.S. states. Ro-
driguez et al. (2014) estimate that in a fully renewable Europe electricity market, a
well interconnected power transmission grid can reduce the backup capacity require-
ment from 24% of total demand down to 15%. These papers do not consider the
coordination mechanisms between power suppliers, which is the focus of our research.
The research in Chapter 6 is also related to the classical transshipment literature,
methodologically. Rudi et al. (2001) study a two-region model with transshipment
where each region makes its ordering decision independently. They nd there ex-
ists a pair of coordinating transshipment prices which lead to the global optimal
inventory decisions and maximize the joint-prot. Dong and Rudi (2004) examine a
two-echelon model and nd that the transshipment generally benets the manufac-
turer while hurts the retailers. When the correlation between the retailers' demands
decreases or the number of retailers increases, the transshipment incurs better pooling
eect. The research of Shao et al. (2011) on a two-echelon model shows that the man-
ufacturer prefers a high transshipment price, while the retailers prefers a low price. If
the transshipment price is low, the manufacturer prefers a centralized retailer rather
than multiple decentralized retailers. System coordination mechanism design is not
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studied in that paper. Though the above papers have covered a wide range of market
structures, the coordination mechanisms for a two-echelon model with transshipment
are not analyzed. In contrast, our research in Chapter 6 proposes a coordination con-
tract for four independent players in a two-echelon market with interregional power
transmission.
In summary, though the above papers discuss many aspects of the renewable
power transmission problem and the general commodity transshipment problem, the
coordination mechanism in a two-echelon renewable power market with interregional
transmission is not fully discussed yet. To ll the gap, we study this type of mar-
ket and propose a coordination mechanism based on TGC oering and transmission
premium, to drive the system performance to global optimum.
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CHAPTER 3
PROBLEM STATEMENT, RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND
CONTRIBUTIONS
3.1 Problem Statement
There are two major research problems in this dissertation. The rst is to study the
impacts of RPS regulation on regional electricity markets. Many states and countries
have set mandatory RPS regulation which requires a certain percentage of power
supply must be from renewable resources. A national TGC market is fast develop-
ing associated with the RPS regulation, and the interregional TGC trade encourages
renewable power to be produced from low cost regions. Because of dierent natural
environment in dierent regions, the xed cost of building renewable capacity and
the variable cost to generate renewable power vary greatly. Moreover, the market
structure could be monopoly or have multiple competing rms. Thus the impacts of
RPS regulation have signicant heterogeneity in dierent regional markets, and an
analytical investigation is needed for them.
The second problem is to study the coordination mechanism facing renewable
energy penetration. With the fast growth of renewable power, the intermittent nature
of the renewable energy sources becomes a threat to the stability of the power gird.
The power outputs from two major renewable sources, wind and solar power, are not
as stable and controllable as the conventional sources, which incurs random power
shortage in the renewable suppliers' outputs. Though the renewable suppliers can
outsource backup power from the conventional suppliers, there is no guarantee that
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enough backup capacity will be prepared. Therefore, there is a need of economical
incentives to encourage the conventional suppliers prepare enough backup capacities
to buer the intermittent renewable power outputs.
3.2 Research Objectives
The objectives of this research are listed as follows.
 Objective 1. Study the impacts of RPS on regional electricity markets in
dierent market structures.
Objective 1.1 Build analytical models for a monopoly market and a duopoly
market. Obtain the close form solutions for the models.
Objective 1.2 Analyze the properties of the models by sensitivity analysis
and numerical analysis.
Objective 1.3 Compare between the models to nd the similarity of and
dierence between them.
 Objective 2. Study the rms' coordination behavior in a single region market
Objective 2.1 Build analytical models for a centralized market, a decen-
tralized market (baseline case), and a coordination contract based on TGC
oering. Obtain the close form solutions for the models.
Objective 2.2 Compare between the models to prove that the coordination
model can achieve the global optimum and outperform the baseline case.
Objective 2.3 Analyze the properties of coordination model by sensitivity
analysis and numerical analysis.
 Objective 3. Study the rms' coordination behavior in a two-region market
with interregional transmission
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Objective 3.1 Build analytical models for a centralized market, a horizon-
tally decentralized market, a fully decentralized market (baseline case), and a
coordination contract based on TGC oering and transmission premium. Ana-
lyze the properties of the global optimal solutions of the models.
Objective 3.2 Compare between the models to prove that the coordination
model can achieve the global optimum and outperform the baseline case.
Objective 3.3 Analyze the properties of coordination model by sensitivity
analysis and numerical analysis.
3.3 Research Contributions
The rapid growth of renewable power in electricity markets introduces many new
research questions on rms' decision makings and system coordination mechanism
design. In literature published so far, the detailed analysis on rms' decisions facing
RPS regulation in regional electricity markets, especially their coordination behavior,
are not sucient. Our research is among the rst batch of works to study in this area.
The main contributions of this research are listed as follows.
 We establish analytical models to describe the power suppliers' decision prob-
lems facing the RPS regulation in regional electricity markets with external
TGC markets.
 We analyze the rms' decisions in a monopoly structure and a duopoly structure,
and compare between the two structures.
 We propose coordination mechanisms based on TGC oering to tackle the ran-
dom power shortage for renewable suppliers. Both a single region structure and
a two-region structure with interregional transmission are considered.
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 We analyze the properties of the coordination mechanisms, prove they can
achieve system coordination and are robust.
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CHAPTER 4
IMPACTS OF THE RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARD ON
REGIONAL ELECTRICITY MARKETS
In this chapter we examine the impacts of the renewable portfolio standard (RPS)
regulation on regional electricity markets. We consider a regional market with one
or two power suppliers with the capacity to generate renewable energy and access to
the tradable green certicate (TGC) market. We establish a monopoly model and a
Nash game duopoly model to study the impacts of TGC price and RPS percentage.
Our analytical results indicate that the green power output may decrease when the
RPS percentage increases in a regional market. Our analytical results also show
that, when the TGC price increases, the green power output increases, and the total
prot rst decreases then increases. Under both regional market structures, there
exists an optimal RPS percentage to maximize the social welfare. We also compare
the dierence between two models with numerical analysis. When the TGC price
increases, the electricity outputs change slower in the duopoly market than in the
monopoly market. The optimal RPS percentage to maximize the social welfare in the
duopoly market is higher than in the monopoly market.
4.1 Models
In this section we establish two models to analyze the regional suppliers' decisions
in the monopoly and duopoly market structures. In the rst structure, a monopoly
supplier generates both green and black power; in the second structure, a black power
supplier and a green power supplier compete with each other.
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4.1.1 Assumptions and Notations
We study a regional electricity market where a group of rational customers are served
by one or two rational suppliers. The suppliers own the generators, and also have
access to the TGC market. The utility function of consuming electricity follows the
classic denition in Microeconomics, U(D) = D=  D2=(2)  pD, where D is the
demand, p > 0 is the retail price,  > 0 is the base demand and  > 0 is the price
sensitivity. The rst term is the benet of consuming D quantity of electricity; the
second term reects the cost of equipment and labor to utilize the electricity; the last
term is the monetary payment to buy electricity.
For customers who try to maximize the utility, there exists a unique optimal or-
der quantity in the linear form D =    p. Newbery (1998) explains that though
in reality the price bidding oered by competitive power suppliers is stair-wise, the
average demand curve faced by a single supplier can be simplied as a linear form
without heavy loss of accuracy. This linear demand function for electricity is also
used in Tamas et al. (2010) and Zhou and Tamas (2010).
We assume the feasible region of black output SB is SB  0, and the feasible
region of green output SG is SG  0. The total output satises the supply-demand
balance SB+SG = D =  p. We assume the black and green power cost functions,
cB(SB) and cG(SG), are positive, monotonically increasing and twice dierentiable ev-
erywhere in SB  0 or SG  0. We assume c00B(SB) > 0 and c00G(SG) > 0 everywhere
in SB  0 or SG  0. It is because in this research, we highlight the scarcity nature
of cheap energy resources in a certain regional power market, both black and green.
Such that to increase either type of power output will lead to an upward sloping curve
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of electricity generation cost. This strict convexity of cost function is also applied in
Fischer (2010), Tanaka and Chen (2013) and other papers in this eld. Lastly, we
assume parameter values for cB(SB) and cG(SG) to ensure that the global optimum is
in the interior of SB  0 and SG  0. In Section 4.2 we introduce the quadratic cost
functions and explain the economical meanings of the bounds of parameter values
which lead to the interior solution.
We assume the unit TGC price of cT > 0 is exogenous in the national TGC mar-
ket, and the national TGC market has an unlimited capacity for the supplier to buy
or sell. This assumption holds when the regional supplier is small and its impact on
the national market is marginal. Let 0    1 denote the RPS percentage. Ac-
cording to recent data, most states have the RPS percentage between 10% and 35%
(Tamas et al. (2010)).
4.1.2 Market Structures
According to Nagurney and Matsypura (2007), a regional electricity market can be
described with four layers: generator, supplier, transmission service provider and
customers, from top to bottom. The left part of Figure 4.1 illustrates the four-layer
market. We simplify the market structure into two layers based on the following con-
siderations. The electricity prices facing nal customers are regulated in most states.
Therefore the layer of transmission service provider is not a decision maker. We let
the transmission layer serve as representative for the customer layer.
Among several groups of electricity market structures categorized by Belyaev
(2011), we focus on the vertical-integrated structure, which is used in many regional
markets. In such structure, one region is served by one or several suppliers, and the
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generators belong to the supplier (similar to \single buyer model" in Belyaev (2011)).
The right part of Figure 4.1 shows a typical single region vertical-integrated structure
prior to RPS regulation, where a single supplier integrated with a black generator
serves the regional customers.
Figure 4.1: A Regional Electricity Market with a Monopoly Supplier
To meet the RPS regulation, besides building new green generators, another way
is to access the national TGC market. Though not fully grown, the framework of
national TGC market is under development in several nations including the U.S. In
the western and the northern regions of Europe, the TGC market is expanding in-
ternationally. With access to the TGC market, the supplier can sell excess TGC if
it generates more green power than the RPS requirement, or buy TGC if less than
required.
Though in a national market there generally exists multiple electricity suppliers
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competing with each other, the electricity markets on the regional level are more
concentrated, and the number of suppliers serving one particular region is small. For
instance, most counties in Oklahoma are served by Oklahoma Gas & Electric Com-
pany only, and many counties in Kentucky are served by Kentucky Utilities Company
only. Besides such monopoly scenario, we also consider the regional markets served
by a black supplier and a green supplier. For example, in the regions with large wind
farms nearby, although the customers have convenient access to the green power, they
still need a steady black power source to provide cushion due to the intermittency
nature of wind power. We model the monopoly market and the duopoly market as
follows.
Monopoly model
Firstly we establish the monopoly model shown in Figure 4.2. The supplier decides
the black output SB and the green output SG. Notice the retail price p is implicitly
decided because of the supply-demand balance SB +SG = D =   p. The supplier
sells excess TGC if SG > D  , or buys TGC if SG < D.
Figure 4.2: Monopoly Structure
The supplier maximizes its prot function as follows, with the feasibility con-
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straints SB  0 and SG  0.8>><>>:
Max (SB; SG) = [
  SB   SG

(SB + SG)]  [cB(SB) + cTSB]  [cG(SG) + (  1)cTSG]
SB  0; SG  0
(4.1)
Lemma 4.1 (SB; SG) is strictly concave on (SB; SG).
Please see appendix for the proof. Then given the assumption that the parameter
values ensure an interior solution of fSB; SGg, there exists a unique optimal solution
of (SB; SG) to maximize the monopoly supplier's prot.
Duopoly model
Secondly we establish the duopoly model shown in Figure 4.3. We assume neither
supplier has signicant market power over another. The black supplier decides SB
and the green supplier decides SG simultaneously in the Nash game.
Figure 4.3: Duopoly Structure
The black supplier maximizes its prot function as follows, with the feasibility
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constraints SB  0.8>><>>:
Max B(SB) =
  SB   SG

SB   cB(SB)  cTSB
SB  0
(4.2)
And the green supplier maximizes its prot function as follows, with the feasibility
constraints SG  0.8>><>>:
Max G(SG) =
  SB   SG

SG   cG(SG) + (1  )cTSG
SG  0
(4.3)
Lemma 4.2 B(SB) and G(SG) are diagonally strictly concave on (SB; SG).
Please see appendix for the proof. Given the assumption that the parameter values
ensure an interior solution of fSB; SGg, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium of
(SB; SG) for the black and the green suppliers.
4.2 Analytical Results
In this section, we focus on the common properties of the two structures. To acquire
the close-form solution of suppliers' decisions and its property, a specic cost function
is needed. We adopt a quadratic form as follows.8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
cB(SB) = b2S
2
B + b1SB + b0
cG(SG) = g2S
2
G + g1SG + g0
b2; g2; b1; g1 > 0; b0; g0  0
For the economical meanings of the parameters, b0  0 and g0  0 are the xed cost
(zero xed cost means the generating facility has been built and free to use). b1 > 0
and g1 > 0 are the variable cost; b2 > 0 and g2 > 0 reect the scarcity nature of
cheap energy resources (both black and green) in this regional market, such that to
increase either type of power output leads to an upward sloping curve of electricity
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generation cost.
In the monopoly structure, the close-form solution of monopoly supplier's optimal
decision derived by rst order condition is as follows.8>>><>>>:
SB =
g1 + g2   b1(1 + g2)  cT (1 + g2)
2(g2 + b2(1 + g2))
SG =
b1 + cT   g1 + b2(+ (   )cT   g1)
2(g2 + b2(1 + g2))
(4.4)
Now we analyze the conditions to ensure an interior solution. For SB > 0, we need
b1 < b
M
1 =
 g2cT   cT + g2 + g1
g2 + 1
and
cT < c
M
T =
 b1g2   b1 + g2 + g1
g2+ 1
:
It means the variable cost of black power and the TGC price cannot be too high, else
generating black power is unprotable. For SG > 0, we need
g1 < g
M
1 =
b2   b2cT + b2cT + b1 + cT
b2 + 1
;
which means the variable cost of green power cannot be too high, else generating
green power is unprotable.
Given equation (4.4), the electricity price p can be derived from the assumption
of supply-demand balance (SB + SG = D =   p). The monopoly supplier's prot
 can be derived from the prot function (Equation 4.1).
In the duopoly structure, the close-form solution of duopoly suppliers' Nash equi-
librium derived by rst order condition is as follows.8>>><>>>:
SB =
+ g1 + 2g2   2b1(1 + g2)  cT (1 + + 2g2)
3 + 4g2 + 4b2(1 + g2)
SG =
+ b1 + 2cT   cT   2g1 + 2b2(+ (   )cT   g1)
3 + 4g2 + 4b2(1 + g2)
(4.5)
26
To ensure an interior solution, similar to the monopoly model, we need upper bounds
of black variable cost, TGC price, and green variable cost as follows.8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
b1 < b
P
1 =
  22g2cT   cT   cT + 2g2 + g1
2 (g2 + 1)
cT < c
P
T =
  2b1   2b12g2 + 2g2 + g1
 (2g2+ + 1)
g1 < g
P
1 =
+ 2b2 + b1   2b22cT + 2b22cT   cT + 2cT
2 (b2 + 1)
Given equation (4.5), the electricity price p can be derived from the assumption
of supply-demand balance (SB + SG = D =    p). The suppliers' prots B and
G can be derived from their prot functions (Equations 4.2 and 4.3).
The impacts of market conditions on the black/green outputs, electricity price,
suppliers' prots and social welfare are analyzed as follows.
Impacts of RPS percentage
Proposition 4.1 In both market structures, when the RPS percentage increases:
 both the black and green output decrease;
 the electricity price increases;
 the suppliers' prots decrease.
The rst result reveals an important dierence between our regional market model
and the national market models. In a national electricity market where TGC is traded
within the market, higher RPS percentage generally leads to higher green power out-
put and lower black power output. Whereas, in a regional electricity market with
TGC available from outside, the increase of RPS percentage does not guarantee an
increase of green output. A recent empirical study by Yin and Powers (2010) supports
our nding, and it points out that allowing free trade of TGC can signicantly weaken
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the eect of RPS aiming for promoting local green power. This result implies that if
the TGC price in the national market is unchanged, increasing the RPS percentage
in a individual region can not push the local supplier to produce more green power
because it will incur higher production cost.
Alternatively, many states set a step-by-step schedule to increase their RPS per-
centages gradually. For example, Oklahoma starts from a 10% in 2010, increases 1%
per year and will reach 15% in 2015. When many regions increase their RPS percent-
ages simultaneously, the overall demand of TGC across the country increases and the
national TGC price may increase. The regional supplier will increase the local green
output in response to higher TGC price, as shown in the Proposition 4.2.
The second and third results are due to higher RPS percentage incurs extra cost
to the regional suppliers in both structures. For the black supplier in the duopoly
structure, it means more TGC must be purchased and submitted to the regional reg-
ulator. For the green supplier in the duopoly structure, similarly more TGC must
be reserved and submitted for itself, and then less TGC for sale. For the monopoly
supplier both eects exist. In all scenarios, the suppliers' costs increase and therefore
the prots decrease.
Impacts of TGC Price
Proposition 4.2 In both market structures, when the TGC price increases:
 the green output increases and the black output decreases;
 the total prot in the monopoly market rst decreases then increases; in the
duopoly structure, the green supplier's prot increases and the black supplier's
prot decreases;
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 the impact on the electricity price depends on the RPS percentage. When the
RPS percentage is low, the electricity price decreases when the TGC price in-
creases; when the RPS percentage is high, the trend reverses.
The rst result is easy to understand. When the TGC becomes more expensive,
the suppliers tend to generate more green output and less black output, in order to
reduce the amount of TGC purchased or increase the amount of TGC sold. The sec-
ond result implies in the duopoly market, higher TGC price naturally leads to higher
prot for the green supplier and lower prot for black supplier. In the monopoly struc-
ture, when the TGC price is very low, the supplier will buy TGC from the national
market and reduce the green output to save cost, and the higher the TGC price, the
less the saving; when the TGC price is very high, the supplier will become a TGC
seller. It generates more green power and thus more TGC as the TGC price increases.
The third result shows the electricity price does not always increase with the TGC
price. When the RPS percentage is low, the supplier is a TGC seller, and higher
TGC price brings more revenue to compensate the green generation cost, which leads
to a reduction of the electricity price. When the RPS percentage is high, the supplier
becomes a TGC buyer, and the eect of TGC price on the electricity price reverses.
In the next section, we compare the dierence of the black/green outputs, electricity
price and the suppliers' prots between two market structures.
Social Welfare Analysis
An important purpose of RPS is to increase the social welfare (W ) whose denition
in Microeconomics is as follows (Tamas et al. (2010)):
social welfare = customer utility - production cost - environmental damage
To quantitatively measure the social welfare, we adopt the following form:
W = [(SB +SG)=  (SB +SG)2=(2)]  (g2S2G+ g1SG+ g0)  (Bb2S2B + b1SB + b0)
29
The rst term is the utility function dened in Section 6.2, the second term is the
green power production cost, and the third term is the black power production cost
and its environmental damage, which is assumed to be quadratic to black power out-
put SB and then reected in the coecient B > 1.
Proposition 4.3 In both market structures, there exists a unique RPS percentage to
maximize the social welfare.
This result shows the regulator could achieve the goal of social welfare maximiza-
tion by setting RPS percentage accordingly. In the next section, we compare the
dierence of the optimal RPS percentage between two market structures.
4.3 Numerical Analysis
In this section we demonstrate several interesting insights by comparison between
the monopoly structure and the duopoly structure. The following parameter values
are adopted in most cases:  = 100;  = 1; b0 = 0; b1 = 15; b2 = 0:1; g0 = 20; g1 =
40; g2 = 1. Any change from these values and other necessary parameter values are
demonstrated on the graph.
Comparison of Black and Green Outputs
As analyzed in previous section, when the TGC price increases, the black output
decreases and the green output increases. Figure 4.4 shows that as the TGC price
increases, the adjustments of black and green outputs are slower in the duopoly
structure than in the monopoly structure.
The reason behind the slower change of black/green outputs of the duopoly sup-
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Figure 4.4: Comparison of Electricity Output on the Impact of TGC Price
pliers is as follows. When facing an increase of the TGC price, the monopoly supplier
only needs to concern with cost reduction, and then decreases the black output and
increases the green output accordingly. While in the duopoly structure, the suppliers
need to consider both cost reduction and maintaining their market shares. When the
TGC price increases, the black supplier will not decrease the output as fast as in the
monopoly structure, because that will yield the market share to the green supplier.
The green supplier will not increase its output signicantly due to concern of driving
down the electricity price. In the next section we analyze the total output since it is
linear to the electricity price.
Comparison of Electricity Price and Suppliers' Prots
In Section 4 we have pointed out when the TGC price increases, the electricity price
decreases if the RPS percentage is low, and increases if the RPS percentage is high.
Interestingly, at certain range the electricity prices in the two structures respond
oppositely to the increase of RPS percentage, as shown in Figure 4.5. When  = 0:15
in the second graph, the duopoly market's electricity price keeps decreasing when the
TGC price increases, but the monopoly supplier is able to drive the electricity price
up with the increased TGC price.
The phenomenon can be explained by the third graph of Figure 4.4. As discussed
previously, when the TGC price increases in the monopoly structure, the monopoly
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Figure 4.5: Comparison of Electricity Price on the Impact of TGC Price
supplier is not as concerned of the market share as in the duopoly structure, and
then the total output decreases and the electricity price increases. In the duopoly
structure, the black supplier is unwilling to yield that much market share to the green
supplier, and the black output decreases slower. Though the green output also in-
creases slower, the total output still increases and then the electricity price decreases.
We also observe that the electricity price in the monopoly structure is higher than
in the duopoly structure, for the lack of competition gives the monopoly supplier
more market power to set a higher price.
We compare the suppliers' prots between the two structures in Figure 4.6. Not
surprisingly, the total prot in the monopoly structure is higher than in the duopoly
structure, which implies a merger between the black and green suppliers may be
desirable, as also pointed out by Zhou and Tamas (2010).
Comparison of Social Welfare
We plot the social welfare of two market structures in Figure 4.7. Noticeably there
exists an optimal RPS percentage for both structures, as mentioned in Proposition
4.3. Though the maximum social welfare values of the two structures are close, the
duopoly structure's optimal RPS percentage is 61%, much higher than the monopoly
structure's optimal percentage 13%. Intuitively, these is competition between suppli-
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Figure 4.6: Comparison of Suppliers' Prots on the Impact of TGC Price
ers in the duopoly structure, and the electricity price is lower than in the monopoly
structure as shown in Figure 4.5. Due to the cheaper electricity price, the customers
in the duopoly structure can support more aggressive plan of green power develop-
ment.
At the optimal point of monopoly structure, the electricity price is high and power
output is low, and then both the utility of consuming electricity and the environmen-
tal damage are at low level. At the optimal point of duopoly structure, the electricity
price is low and total electricity output is high. Both the utility of consuming elec-
tricity and the environmental damage are higher in the duopoly structure than in the
monopoly structure. In summary, the duopoly structure is benecial to keep a high
RPS percentage without hurting the social welfare.
4.4 Summary of Chapter 4
This chapter examines the impacts of the renewable portfolio standard regulation on
a regional electricity market. Both a monopoly market and a Nash game duopoly
market are analyzed. In the monopoly market, a single supplier decides both the
black and green power outputs. In the duopoly market, a black supplier and a green
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Figure 4.7: Comparison of Social Welfare
supplier decide their outputs simultaneously. The electricity price is determined by
the total output with a linear demand function. The suppliers have access to the
national tradable green certicate market.
We nd the close-form solutions and analyze the impacts of the TGC price and
the RPS percentage on the black/green outputs, the electricity price and the suppli-
ers' prots under the two structures. We nd in a regional electricity market with
TGC available from outside, the increase of local RPS percentage does not guaran-
tee an increase of local green output. The green power output decreases when the
RPS percentage increases in the regional electricity market if the TGC price in the
national market remains unchanged, because the supplier has the option to buy TGC
from outside instead of self-production which incurs high product cost. In contrast,
a higher TGC price can eectively promote the local green power output.
From a policy implementation point of view, we suggest the regional regulators
collectively and gradually increase their RPS percentages to push up the overall de-
mand of TGC across the country, which will increase the national TGC price. As the
national TGC becomes more expensive, the regional suppliers will have the incentive
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to increase the local green outputs.
The impact of TGC price on the electricity price depends on the RPS percentage.
When the RPS percentage is low, the supplier is a TGC seller, and higher TGC price
brings more revenue to compensate the green generation cost, which leads to a reduc-
tion of the electricity price. When the RPS percentage is high, the supplier becomes
a TGC buyer, and the eect of TGC price on the electricity price reverses. When the
TGC price increases, the total prot rst decreases then increases. When the TGC
price is very low, the supplier will buy TGC from the national market and reduce the
green output to save cost, and the higher the TGC price, the less the saving; when
the TGC price is very high, the supplier will become a TGC seller. It generates more
green power and thus more TGC as the TGC price increases.
By comparing the two structures with numerical analysis we have the following
insights. In the duopoly market, the electricity price and suppliers' prot are lower,
and the total electricity supply is higher. The electricity outputs change slower in the
duopoly structure than in the monopoly structure when the TGC price increases. It is
because the monopoly supplier only needs to pay attention to cost reduction and can
respond rapidly; while the suppliers in the duopoly structure need to be concerned
with both cost reduction and keeping their market shares. We nd there exists an
optimal RPS percentage to maximize the social welfare in each structure, respectively.
To maximize the social welfare, the optimal RPS percentage in the duopoly market
is higher than in the monopoly market.
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CHAPTER 5
Capacity Coordination in Regional Electricity Market Based on Tradable
Green Certicate Oering
In this chapter we study a coordination mechanism between a renewable supplier and
a conventional supplier in a regional electricity market. The intermittent nature of the
renewable supplier results in random power shortage. Though the renewable supplier
can buy backup power from a conventional supplier who prepares backup capacity
to cover the shortage, there is no commitment that enough backup capacity will be
prepared without any incentives to the conventional supplier. We design a coordi-
nation mechanism where the renewable supplier oers the conventional supplier free
tradable green certicate (TGC) proportional to the backup capacity. We prove that
this mechanism coordinates the conventional supplier's decision on backup capacity
and arbitrarily splits the system prot between the two suppliers by the wholesale
price. Our analytical results show that when the shortage cost increases, the backup
capacity increases, the TGC oering rate increases, the total prot decreases, the
renewable supplier's prot decreases but the conventional supplier's prot increases.
We also show analytically that the social welfare under this mechanism is higher than
in the baseline case unless the environmental damage of conventional power is ex-
tremely high. By numerical analysis, we show that the coordination mechanism is
robust.
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5.1 Models
In this section we rstly introduce the assumptions and notations, and then describe
a centralized model, a decentralized model (baseline case), and a coordination model.
5.1.1 Assumptions and Notations
We study a regional electricity market served by a renewable supplier (G). G utilizes
intermittent energy sources which cause random power shortage. We assume there is
not enough low-price power available in the balancing market to cover the shortage,
and then an adjacent conventional supplier (B) prepares S units of backup capacity
dedicated to buer G's demand. Notice the participants of the regional market can
be a single supplier or a coalition of suppliers acting as a single decision maker (An-
dersen and Lund (2007)). For simplicity, we treat the latter also as a single supplier.
To represent the intermittency nature of the renewable energy sources, let a series
of non-negative random variables, xt, t = 1; :::;m, denote the shortage faced by G at
period t. The p.d.f. of xt is ft(:), which is continuous and dened on xt  0. We
assume for at least one period t, ft(:) is not always zero when xt > 0, to avoid the
trivial scenario of zero shortage. For simplicity we assume the overall shortage cost
is linear to the shortage quantity. Though B provides backup capacity to cover the
shortage, if in some periods the shortage exceeds the backup capacity (xt > S), the
shortage cost incurred on G will be cu
mP
t=1
max(0; xt S), where cu > 0 is the unit cost
of power shortage, including using the expensive ancillary services or buying power
from the balancing market at a higher price, paying ne to the regional ISO due to
demand cutting, losing reputation among the customers, etc.
To prepare the backup capacity, we assume B incurs a capacity cost that is linear
to the backup capacity quantity as cfS. We also assume the variable cost is linear to
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the power output quantity as cv
mP
t=1
min(xt; S), where cv represents the unit variable
cost related to power generation and transmission, including the fuel cost, operation
and maintenance, transmission loss, etc. The overall cost function of B is cfS +
cv
mP
t=1
min(xt; S). To ensure the investment on the backup capacity is protable, we
assume cv < r, the variable cost is less than the electricity price; and m is large
enough such that (r+ cu  cv)
mP
t=1
min(xt; S) > cfS, the overall revenue plus saving of
shortage cost during m periods of operation is greater than the capacity cost. Lastly,
after meeting G's demand, B can sell the residue capacity on the balancing market if
it is protable. In this research, we normalize this residue value to zero, and it does
not change our main results.
5.1.2 Centralized Model
The centralized model (C) describes a market structure where G and B merge as one
rm. The centralized rm decides the backup capacity S to maximize its total prot
as follows, with the feasibility constraint S  0.
C(S) = R  cu D + (r   cv + cu)Y (S)  cfS; (5.1)
where R is a constant denoting the basic revenue that G collects from the regional
market. r is the unit price of backup power. D =
mP
t=1
R1
0
xtft(xt)dxt, is a constant de-
noting the expected demand (shortage). Y (S) =
mP
t=1
[
R S
0
xtft(xt)dxt+
R +1
S
Sft(xt)dxt],
is the expected amount of backup power delivered to G. Y (S) takes the standard form
of Newsvendor model, and it is easy to prove Y (S) is a monotonically increasing and
concave function of S by using Leibniz's rule to obtain the rst and second derivatives
(Khouja (1999)).
By using the rst order condition @C=@S = 0, we have:
F (SC) = m  cf=(r   cv + cu); (5.2)
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where F (:) =
mP
t=1
Ft(:) is the sum of c.d.f. of the random demands in m periods.
It is the expected number of periods that the shortage is completely covered by the
backup capacity. Notice (r + cu   cv)mS  (r + cu   cv)
mP
t=1
min(xt; S) > cfS, such
that m   cf=(r   cv + cu) > 0. Also it is easy to verify that F (0) = 0 and F (S)
monotonically increases on S. Then SC > 0 is an interior solution.
By using the second order condition , we have @2C=@S
2 =  (r+cu cv)
mP
t=1
ft(:) <
0. Such that C is strictly concave and the rst order condition (Equation (5.2))
denes the unique global optimal solution of backup capacity SC .
5.1.3 Decentralized Model
The decentralized model (D) serves as a baseline case that the two suppliers operate
independently. B sells backup power to G at a wholesale price w. We assume all
suppliers' margins are positive, that is r > w > cv. G decides w and its prot is
DG = R  cu D + (r + cu   w)Y (S):
B decides to prepare S units of backup capacity to maximize its prot as follows,
with the feasibility constraint S  0.
DB(S) = (w   cv)Y (S)  cfS:
The system prot of decentralized model takes the same form as in the centralized
model shown in Equation 5.1.
By using the rst order condition @DB=@S = 0, we have:
F (SD) = m  cf=(w   cv):
By using the second order condition , we have @2DB=@S
2 =  (w   cv)
mP
t=1
ft(:) < 0.
Such that DB is strictly concave and the rst order condition denes the unique global
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optimal solution of backup capacity SD. Similar to the Model C, to ensure an interior
solution of SD > 0, we need the parameter values that m  cf=(w  cv) > 0, or equiv-
alently w > cf=m+ cv. The economical meaning of this condition is straightforward:
only when the wholesale price is greater than of per period capacity cost plus the
variable cost, B is willing to build backup capacity.
It is easy to see the investment in the baseline case is less than the global opti-
mum shown in Equation (5.2), F (SD) < F (SC) = m  cf
r   cv + cu . Then the system
prot in the baseline case is less than in the coordination model. It is because in the
decentralized model B only concerns its own prot without considering G's shortage
cost. On the other hand, G does not oer any incentive to B and then does not share
the risk of investing on the backup capacity with B, which leads to under investment
of backup capacity.
In the decentralized model, customers can only rely on a higher electricity price
r to encourage the conventional supplier to invest more on the backup capacity. By
comparing between SD and SC , even when w = r such that the double marginalization
is eliminated, the electricity price needs to be increased from r to r + cu to drive
the investment up to the global optimum. However, it is not reasonable to let the
customer bear this increased price. The customers are generally willing to pay higher
price and encourage the investment on backup capacity to buer their own demand
uncertainty, such as demand spikes during peak periods. But the power shortage due
to supply uncertainty is not the customers' problem, and they may not be willing to
pay higher price for that. Therefore we need a market mechanism to encourage B to
build up more backup capacity.
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5.1.4 Coordination Model
We design a coordination contract (Model P) aiming to provide an incentive for B to
prepare the backup capacity for G up to the global optimal level. According to the
contract, G oers S units of free TGC to B, where  is a TGC oering rate decided
by G. In this research we assume G generates sucient TGC to cover the oering
and sells the rest in the national TGC market.
Please notice that the form of TGC incentives is not limited to the free oering
specied above. For example, ong S units of free TGC is equivalent to sell K
units of TGC in a discount price (1  d)cT to B, where d < 1 is the discount rate and
cT is the price of TGC in the national market, if d = S=(cTK). There also exists
other equivalent forms of TGC transaction, but we focus on free TGC oering in this
research.
According to the contract, G buys electricity from B at a wholesale price w. The
amount of revenue G gains from selling electricity is (r   w)
mP
t=1
min(xt; S) and B's
revenue is (w  cv)
mP
t=1
min(xt; S). The wholesale price serves as a lever to allocate the
prot between the two parties. We assume both suppliers' unit prots through this
coordination are positive, that is r > w > cv.
The coordination model is shown in Figure 5.1. The contract denes a Stackelberg
game where the sequence of events is as follows.
Stage 1: G decides the TGC oering rate  and the wholesale price w.
Stage 2: B decides the backup capacity S.
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Figure 5.1: The Market Structure of Coordination Model
The prot functions of the two suppliers in the coordination model are as follows.8>><>>:
G(; w) = R  cu D   S + (r   w + cu)Y (S)
B(S) = (   cf )S + (w   cv)Y (S)
(5.3)
5.2 Analytical Results
In this section we rstly perform the coordination analysis to show that the coordina-
tion contract drives the conventional supplier prepare backup capacity at the global
optimal level. Then we perform the sensitivity analysis and the social welfare analysis
to reveal more properties of the coordination model.
5.2.1 Coordination Analysis
Theorem 5.1 The coordination model has the following properties.
 The system achieves coordination when the two parameters (; w) satisfy the
following condition:
 = cf
r   w + cu
r   cv + cu : (5.4)
 By adjusting the wholesale price w, the system prot can be arbitrarily allocated
between the two suppliers.
42
 When the system is coordinated, there exists a unique global optimal solution
of backup capacity SP that simultaneously maximizes the total prot and both
suppliers' prots satisfying the following condition:
F (SP ) = m  cf
r   cv + cu ; (5.5)
where F (:) =
mP
t=1
Ft(:) is the sum of c.d.f. of the random demands in m periods.
Please refer to the appendix for all the proofs.
The coordination property is based on the design of the coordination mechanism
that by oering free TGC, G shares a portion of the system risk with B and then
encourages B investing on the backup capacity at the global optimal level. To intu-
itively explain the coordination condition specied in Theorem 5.1, let us compare
Equation (5.3) with Equation (5.1). When (; w) meets the coordination condition
as shown in Equation (5.4), we have8>><>>:
G(S) = aC(S)  b
B(S) = (1  a)C(S) + b
where fa; bg are parameters indicating the allocation of system prot between the
two suppliers. 8>><>>:
a =

cf
=
r   w + cu
r   cv + cu
b = (1  a)cu D
Then there exists a global optimal S to maximize fC(S);G(S);B(S)g simultane-
ously, and the optimal capacity in the coordination model reaches the global optimum
as shown in the centralized model (Equation (5.2)), SP = SC . It also shows w is a
lever to arbitrarily split the total prot.
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5.2.2 Sensitivity Analysis
Here we examine the impacts of market conditions on the suppliers' decisions and
their prots in the coordination model. We consider the following market conditions:
the capacity cost (cf ), the electricity price (r), the variable cost (cv), and the shortage
cost (cu). At the end of this section we summarize the results in Table 6.2.
Firstly we study the impacts on the two suppliers' decisions: backup capacity and
TGC rate. According to Equation (5.4), the TGC rate () is a linear function of
wholesale price (w) when the system is coordinated. Since we are more interested in
, we x w to highlight the changing of .
Proposition 5.1 When the wholesale price (w) is unchanged, the impacts of market
conditions on the backup capacity (SP ) and the TGC oering rate () are as follows.
 When the capacity cost (cf) increases or the variable cost (cv) increases, the
backup capacity (SP ) decreases and the TGC oering rate () increases.
 When the electricity price (r) increases or the shortage cost (cu) increases, the
backup capacity (SP ) increases and the TGC oering rate () increases.
The rst result reveals that higher capacity cost or variable cost pushes up B's cost
burden, and B's investment on the backup capacity decreases. Facing this change,
G will increase TGC oering rate to encourage B's investment. The second result
reveals that when the backup power becomes more valuable, G oers more TGC to
encourage B investing more on the backup capacity.
Secondly we study the impacts on the prots.
Proposition 5.2 The impacts of market conditions on the total prot and the two
suppliers' prots are as follows.
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 When the capacity cost (cf) increases, the total prot (C) decreases. Both
the renewable supplier's prot (G) and the conventional supplier's prot (B)
decrease.
 When the electricity price (r) increases or the variable cost (cv) decreases, the
total prot (C) increases. Both the renewable supplier's prot (G) and the
conventional supplier's prot (B) increase.
 When the shortage cost (cu) increases, the total prot (C) decreases, the re-
newable supplier's prot (G) decreases but the conventional supplier's prot
(B) increases.
The rst result reveals that when the capacity cost is higher, the system-wide cost
increases and the total prot decreases. It is a direct cost burden on B and its prot
decreases. G shares this burden by oering more TGC (Proposition 5.1), and its prot
also decreases. The second result reveals that when the margin of selling electricity
is higher, the total prot increases. If r increases, G directly gains more prot and it
oers more TGC to B (Proposition 5.1). If cv decreases, B directly gains more prot
and G reduces its TGC oering to B (Proposition 5.1). In both conditions the two
suppliers share the prot gain and their prots increase. The third result reveals that
when the shortage cost is higher, the system-wide cost increases and the total prot
decreases. G needs more backup capacity to cover the electricity shortage. Such that
G oers more TGC to B (Proposition 5.1), which leads to a decrease of G's prot
and an increase of B's prot.
The sensitivity analysis results are summarized in Table 6.2.
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SP  C G B
cf " # " # # #
cv " # " # # #
r " " " " " "
cu " " " # # "
Table 5.1: Summary of the Sensitivity Analysis in Chapter 5
5.2.3 Social Welfare Analysis
An important purpose to promote renewable energy is to increase the social welfare,
whose denition in Microeconomics is as follows (Tamas et al. (2010)):
social welfare = customer utility - production cost - environmental damage
To quantitatively measure the social welfare (W ) in the regional market of our
research, we adopt the following form:
W = U(Y (S))  cvY (S)  cu( D   Y (S))  cfS
The rst term U(Y (S)) is a general form of utility function for the generated elec-
tricity, which includes the environmental damage. We assume U 0 > 0 (monotonically
increasing) and U 00 < 0 (concave). The second term is the variable cost to generate
backup power. The third term measures the society's disutility of power shortage.
Being the only power supplier in the regional market, G takes all the reputation loss
due to the inconvenience caused by power shortage. Thus we assume the society's
disutility is close to G' shortage cost, and use the same cu here. The last term is the
capacity cost to build the backup capacity.
Proposition 5.3 There exists a unique optimal capacity of SW to maximize the social
welfare in the regional market in the following form:
F (SW ) = m  cf
U 0   cv + cu :
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To compare SW with the optimal capacity in the coordination structure (SP ) and
in the decentralized structure (SD), we need a specic form of utility function. We let
U(Y ) = u1Y  (u2+e)Y 2, where u1 is the unit utility of consuming power, u2 evaluates
the diminishing return property, and e is the environmental damage factor. This form
is in line with Tamas et al. (2010) and other papers analyzing the utility of electricity
power. Give the above U(Y ), we nd the relationships between fSW ; SP ; SDg depend
on the environmental damage (e) as follows.
Proposition 5.4 Given U(Y ) = u1Y   (u2 + e)Y 2, SW decreases with the environ-
mental damage e. To compare with SP and SD we have:
 when e is low such that e  (u1   r)=(2Y )  u2, SD < SP  SW ;
 when e is high such that e  (u1 + cu   w)=(2Y )  u2, SW  SD < SP ;
 when e is medium such that (u1  r)=(2Y )  u2 < e < (u1+ cu w)=(2Y )  u2,
SD < SW < SP .
To interpret the results, rstly we notice SD is always lower than SP , since the de-
centralized structure leads to under investment comparing to the coordination struc-
ture. Secondly, if the environmental damage e is low, building more backup capacity
leads to higher power output without heavy environmental damage, which makes SW
larger; if e is high, the trend reverses and SW becomes smaller. Please see Figure 5.2
illustrating the social welfare under dierent values of e, where u1 = 80, u2 = 0:1,
and the other parameter values are the same as in Section 6.3.
5.3 Numerical Analysis
In this section we perform numerical analysis to illustrate the following properties
of the coordination model. Firstly, when the TGC oering rate deviates from the
optimal point, the system prot only decreases slightly. Secondly, the wholesale price
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Figure 5.2: Social Welfare under Dierent Environmental Damage Value
serves as a lever to allocate the system prot between the two suppliers. Lastly,
there exists a range of wholesale price where the coordination structure is a Pareto
improvement for both suppliers comparing to the baseline case.
The parameter values presented in this section are of illustrative purpose and
do not refer to a specic market. The data setting is fcu = 5; r = 1:1; cv =
0:1; cf = 0:9; R = 100g, which is based on Marchenko (2007) and Marchenko (2008),
whereas we increase the shortage cost and the capacity cost to highlight the impact
of these two factors. The demand functions are a series of normal distribution as
fxt  N(t; t); t = 1  4g where f1 = 20; 2 = 40; 3 = 60; 4 = 80; 1 = 2 =
3 = 4 = 10g. The normal distribution data is based on Milligan et al. (2010),
whereas we highlight the dierence between the demands in dierent periods, such
that the performance of coordination mechanism can be tested under high demand
uncertainty.
Robustness of the Coordination Contract
Due to the complexity of the regional electricity market, it is dicult to accurately
estimate and predict all market conditions. Thus the renewable supplier may not be
able to make a perfect TGC oering rate  at its optimal point which is 0:758 given the
above parameters. To study the impacts of inaccurate TGC oering rate on the total
prot, we allow an error of 15% of the optimal point (0:64  0:87). We nd that
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the performance of the coordination model is robust. As shown in Figure 6.4, even
when  deviates from the optimal point to 15%, the total prot loss of coordination
model is only up to 3% (the percentage is calculated as (114:1   110:5)=114:1, after
dropping the basic revenue R = 100). The reduced prot 210:5 still signicantly
outperforms the decentralized model at 176:7.
Figure 5.3: Robustness of the Coordination Model
Impacts of the Wholesale Price
In the coordination framework, the wholesale price w serves as a lever to allocate the
system prot between the two parties. When w increases, the renewable supplier's
prot PG(w) decreases and the conventional supplier's prot 
P
B(w) increases. The
total prot can be arbitrarily allocated between the two parties, as shown in Figure
5.4.
To ensure the coordination structure is a Pareto improvement for both suppliers
comparing to the decentralized structure, the wholesale price must be properly de-
cided. Firstly we notice the system prot in the coordination structure is more than
in the decentralized structure where the capacity is under invested, which means
PB+
P
G > 
D
B +
D
G . Secondly, by adjusting the wholesale price w, the system prot
can be arbitrarily allocated between the two suppliers in the coordination model.
Then we can nd the range of w where both suppliers have higher prots than in the
49
Figure 5.4: Arbitrary Split of System Prot
baseline case. Derived from PG(wU) = 
D
G , 
P
B(wL) = 
D
B and Equation (5.3), we
have the close form of w's lower bound and upper bound as follows.8>><>>:
wL = (
D
B + (cf   )S)=Y (S) + cv
wU = r + cu   (DG  R + S + cu D)=Y (S)
Notice wU > wL is guaranteed by 
P
G +
P
B = (r+ cu   cv)Y (S)  cfS +R  cu D) >
DG +
D
B ) wU > wL. As shown in Figure 5.5, given the previous parameters, in the
decentralized structure G will set the wholesale price w = 0:86 to maximize its prot,
such that DG = 65:3 and 
D
B = 78:6. From the above equations we can calculate that
wL = 0:523 and wU = 0:9. When 0:523 < w < 0:9 the coordination structure is a
Pareto improvement comparing to the decentralized structure.
5.4 Summary of Chapter 5
This chapter studies a coordination framework between a renewable supplier and a
conventional supplier in a regional electricity market. The energy sources of the re-
newable supplier are intermittent and lead to random power shortage. To encourage
the conventional supplier to build backup capacity to cover the shortage, we design a
coordination mechanism where the renewable supplier oers the conventional supplier
free tradable green certicate proportional to the backup capacity. The renewable
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Figure 5.5: Pareto Improvement
supplier decides the TGC oering rate and the wholesale price of backup power, and
then the conventional supplier decides the quantity of backup capacity.
With the close-form solution of this coordination model, we prove the contract
achieves the system coordination. The system prot can be arbitrarily allocated be-
tween the two suppliers by adjusting the wholesale price. We study a baseline case
without coordination and prove the baseline case leads to under investment of the
backup capacity. By comparing to the baseline case, we nd the coordination model
can achieve Pareto improvement for both suppliers.
Sensitivity analysis is conducted on the impacts of following market conditions.
Firstly, when the capacity cost increases, the backup capacity decreases and the TGC
oering rate increases. Both suppliers' prots decrease and the total prot decreases.
Secondly, when the electricity price increases or the variable cost decreases, the backup
capacity increases and the TGC oering rate decreases. Both suppliers' prots in-
crease and the total prot increases. Lastly, when the shortage cost increases, the
backup capacity increases and the TGC oering rate increases. The total prot de-
creases, the renewable supplier's prot decreases but the conventional supplier's prot
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increases.
Social welfare analysis is conducted, and we nd that the social welfare of the co-
ordination structure will be greater than of the baseline case unless the environmental
damage of conventional power is extremely high.
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CHAPTER 6
Capacity Coordination between Renewable and Conventional Suppliers
in Regional Electricity Markets with Interregional Transmission
In this chapter we study a capacity coordination mechanism between the renewable
suppliers and the conventional suppliers in regional electricity markets with inter-
regional transmission. The intermittent nature of the renewable suppliers leads to
random power shortage. The conventional suppliers prepare backup capacity to cover
the shortage, but there is no commitment that enough backup capacity will be pre-
pared without any incentives to the conventional supplier. We design a coordination
mechanism that the renewable suppliers oer tradable green certicate (TGC) in re-
turn for backup capacity committed by the conventional suppliers. The quantity of
free TGC is proportional to the backup capacity. The conventional suppliers decide
the interregional transmission prices between them. We prove that this mechanism
coordinates the conventional suppliers' decisions on backup capacity and achieves the
global optimum. In contrast, an uncoordinated baseline case leads to under invest-
ment of backup capacity and the system prot is less than the global optimum. In
the coordination model, when the transmission cost increases, the backup capacity in
a region increases if this region is a net importer of backup power, or decreases if it
is a net exporter. By numerical analysis, we show that the coordination mechanism
is robust.
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6.1 Models
In this section we start from the assumptions and notations, and then establish a
series of models to describe the market structures. Firstly we establish a centralized
model where all suppliers in the two regions form a single decision maker, which leads
to the global optimal decision of backup capacity. Secondly, we consider a horizontally
decentralized model where the two regions operate independently and they negotiate
a pair of transmission prices between them. We prove that it's best performance is
equivalent to the centralized model, when the transmission prices are properly set to
coordinate the system. Thirdly, we study a decentralized model (baseline case), where
all suppliers operate independently. The baseline case leads to under investment of the
backup capacity. Lastly, still considering the market structure with fully independent
suppliers, we design a capacity coordination contract to drive the system to global
optimum.
6.1.1 Assumptions and Notations
We study an electricity market across two regions i; j = 1; 2, and i 6= j. Each region
is served by a renewable supplier (Gi). Gi utilizes intermittent energy sources which
cause random power shortage. To cover this shortage, a local conventional supplier
(Bi) prepares Si units of backup capacity dedicated to buer Gi's demand, and sup-
plies power to Gi when the shortage occurs. Let ST = Si+Sj denote the total backup
capacity in the two markets. We assume Gi and Gj use the same type of generation
technology, and so do Bi and Bj. Since the two regions are close to each other, it is
reasonable to assume the revenue and cost of backup power in the two regions have
no signicant dierence. Thus we assume a homogeneous electricity price and cost
structure for both regions, and thus highlight the dierence in their demand functions.
We assume all suppliers have public knowledge on the historical data of customer
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demand and the intermittency pattern of renewable energy sources. To represent the
intermittency pattern in region i, let a series of random variables, xti, t = 1; :::;m,
denote the shortage faced by Gi at period t. The p.d.f. of x
t
i is f
t
i (:). These random
demands need not to be independent. For simplicity we assume the overall shortage
cost is linear to the shortage quantity. Though Bi provides backup capacity to cover
the shortage, it is possible that in some periods the shortage exceeds the backup ca-
pacity (xti > Si). We assume the shortage cost incurred on Gi is cu
mP
t=1
(xi   Si)+ (we
abbreviate max(0; X) as (X)+ in this chapter), where cu > 0 is the penalty for each
unit of power shortage, including using expensive ancillary services or buying high
price power at the balancing market, ne paid to the regional ISO due to demand
cutting, reputation loss among the customers, etc.
To prepare the backup power, we assume Bi incurs a capacity cost that is linear
to the backup capacity quantity as cfSi. We assume the variable cost is linear to the
power output quantity as cv
mP
t=1
min(xti; Si), where cv represents the unit variable cost
related to power generation, including the fuel cost, operation and maintenance, dy-
namic balancing control, etc. The overall cost function of Bi is cfSi+cv
mP
t=1
min(xti; Si).
Let r denote the backup power price, and v = r + cu   cv denote the unit value
of generated power. To ensure the investment on the backup capacity is protable,
we assume cv < r, the variable cost is less than the electricity price; and m is large
enough such that v
mP
t=1
(min(xt; Si)+min(xt; Sj)) > cf (Si+Sj), the overall revenue plus
saving of shortage cost duringm periods of operation is greater than the capacity cost.
Let ct denote the homogeneous unit transmission cost between two regions, includ-
ing power loss over distance, renting fee of the transmission lines, reactive power cost,
etc. We assume v > ct such that the interregional power transmission is protable.
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After meeting Gi's and Gj's demands, Bi and Bj can sell the residue capacities on
the balancing market if protable. In this research, we normalize this residue value
to zero, and it does not change our main results.
Since the power loss factor is very important in the transmission process, hereby we
discuss how to approximate it as a component of the transmission cost. Let 0 < l < 1
denote the loss percentage, such that for 1 unit sending out the receiver gets 1   l
unit. Firstly, for every unit power to be transmitted, the sender need to generate
1=(1  l) units of power. Then the enlarged unit variable cost is cv=(1  l) = cv+cv,
cv = cvl=(1   l). Secondly, the investment on the backup capacity may also be
enlarged. Let S0 denote the original optimal capacity and T0 =
mP
t=1
T t0 denote the
power to be sent out. After introducing l, the capacity needs to be enlarged to
S0 +S, where S = (max
t=1m
(xt + T t0=(1  l))  S0)+. The enlarged capacity incurs
extra capacity cost as cfS, but also brings extra revenue in the local power market
as v
mP
t=1
min((xt   S0)+;S). Since S causes deviation from the original optimal
capacity, the overall eect is an enlarged capacity cost cf = cfS  v
mP
t=1
min((xt 
S0)
+;S). Combining the above two points together, the unit cost associated to the
power loss is cf=T0+cv. In summary, as the demand distributions are known, for
any given power loss percentage l we can estimate its associated cost and then add
into the overall transmission cost ct.
6.1.2 Centralized Model
In the centralized model (Model C), we assume all suppliers form a single centralized
rm. Power transmission will occur if one region's backup capacity cannot fully cover
the local shortage while the other region has extra backup power. For example, if Bi
cannot meet the local demand (Si < x
t
i), it will ask Bj for a transmission quote. If Bj
has extra backup capacity after satisfying its own demand (Sj > x
t
j), it will transmit
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all the extra to Bi (because it is protable). Let T
t
ij = min((Si   xti)+; (xtj   Sj)+)
denote the power transmitted from region i to region j at period t, and Tij =
mP
t=1
T tij
denote the overall transmitted power. Though in each period T tijT
t
ji = 0, generally
TijTji 6= 0.
Notice in this research we exclude the scenario that Gi directly transmits its power
to Gj. We assume the interregional transmission lines are only between Bi and Bj in
the grid topology. This assumption reects the reality that the conventional suppliers
are close to major power loads and a well-connected grid have been established to
accommodate them. On the contrary, in most cases the renewable power farms are
located in remote areas and lack direct transmission lines between them.
Now the centralized rm decides the backup capacities in two regions fSi; Sjg to
maximize its prot function as follows, with the feasibility constraints Si  0 and
Sj  0.
C(Si; Sj) =Ri +Rj   cu( Di + Dj)  cf (Si + Sj)
+ Efv
mX
t=1
(min(xti; Si) + min(x
t
j; Sj)) + (v   ct)(Tij + Tji)g;
(6.1)
where Ri =
mP
t=1
Rti is a constant denoting the base revenue collected from region i.
Di =
mP
t=1
R1
0
xtif
t
i (x
t
i)dx
t
i, is a constant denoting the overall expected demand (short-
age) in region i.
Lemma 6.1 The prot function in Model C (Equation (6.1)) is concave in (Si; Sj),
and thus the global optimal capacity fSi; Sjg satises the following rst order condi-
tion:
Fi(Si) = m  cf=v + (1  ct=v)( ij(Si; Sj)  ij(Sj; Sj)) (6.2)
f Fi; ij; ijg are summations of m event probabilities in region i. Their properties are
as follows:
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 Fi =
mP
t=1
F ti , where F
t
i = Prfxti < Sig (c.d.f. of the random variable xti), is the
probability that the local demand is less than the local capacity at period t.
And then Fi is the expected number of periods that there is no shortage locally.
 ij =
mP
t=1
tij, where 
t
ij = Prfxtj   Sj > Si   xti > 0g = @EfT tijg=@Si, is the
probability that all the extra power of region i is needed to cover the shortage
in region j at period t (Event Ei). ij is the expected number of periods that
Event Ei happens.
 ij =
mP
t=1
tij, where 
t
ij = PrfSj   xtj > xti   Si > 0g =  @EfT tjig=@Si, is the
probability that the extra power of region j is more than enough to cover the
shortage in region i at period t (Event Ii). ij is the expected number of periods
that Event Ii happens.
 If ij > ij, region i is a \net exporter", i.e., the probability of sending power is
higher than of receiving power; if ij < ij, region i is a \net importer", i.e., the
probability of receiving power is higher than of sending power. Please notice
that a \net importer" might still export in some periods, and vice versa.
In Chapter 5 we have showed the interior solution property without the power trans-
mission ( Fi(Si) = m   cf=v > 0 such that Si > 0). Hereby to keep Si > 0 with the
power transmission feature, we need an additional condition (1   ct=v)( ij(Si; Sj)  
ij(Sj; Sj)) >  (m   cf=v). The economical meaning is that the scales of power
shortage in the two regions will not be extremely dierent. For example, assuming
region j has a power shortage much larger than region i, then the centralized rm
will build a large backup capacity in region j, and region i can always import from j
and thus does not need a local backup capacity. In our research, we do not consider
this heavily unbalanced scenario with only unidirectional transmission.
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No transmission scenario (N)
To highlight the eect of interregional transmission, hereby we consider a no trans-
mission scenario, which may be due to a lack of power lines or a heavy transmission
loss making the power transmission uneconomical. The decisions in the two regions
are independent in this case. The centralized rm decides the backup capacity Si to
maximize its prot in region i as follows, with the feasibility constraints Si  0 and
Sj  0.
Ni (Si) = Ri   cu Di + Efv
mX
t=1
min(xti; Si)g   cfSi: (6.3)
By comparing to the transmission scenario, it is easy to see C = Ni +
N
j +Ef(v 
ct)(Tij + Tji)g, such that C > Ni +Nj given v > ct. In another word, the practice
of power transmission is protable if the value of backup power is greater than the
transmission cost.
Lemma 6.2 There exists a unique global optimal capacity fSi; Sjg in Model N which
is determined by the following condition:
Fi(S
N
i ) = m  cf=v: (6.4)
Comparing to the optimal capacity Si in Model C, S
N
i > (<)Si if
ij > (<) ij.
Notice Model N is same to the centralized model in Chapter 5 and leads to the
classical newsvender solution. Comparing Equation 6.2 and 6.4, the solution of ca-
pacities in the transmission scenario is an adjustment on the no-transmission solution
based on the probability of power import and export. If region i is a \net exporter"
( ij > ij), the capacity in the transmission scenario is higher than in the no trans-
mission scenario; if the trend reverses and region i becomes a \net importer", the
capacity in the transmission scenario is lower. In summary, after allowing the power
transmission, whether the backup capacity will increase or decrease depends on the
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demand distributions. This uncertainty is also discussed by Rudi et al. (2001), Dong
and Rudi (2004), Hu et al. (2007) and Shao et al. (2011) in their respective model
settings.
6.1.3 Horizontally Decentralized Model
In this section we study a horizontally independent structure (Model H) where each
region has one supplier owning both the renewable and the conventional generators.
There are a pair of transmission prices fpHij ; pHjig charged for the interregional power
transmission, where pHij is the price region i charges to region j and vice versa. We
assume the power exporter bears the transmission cost and ct + cv < p
H
ij (p
H
ji) <
r + cu, such that the power transmission is protable for both the exporter and
the importer. The prot function of the supplier of region i is as follows, with the
feasibility constraint Si  0.
Hi (Si; Sj) = Ri cu Di cfSi+Efv
mX
t=1
min(xti; Si)+(p
H
ij ct cv)Tij+(r+cu pHji)Tjig:
(6.5)
Comparing to Equation (6.1), it is easy to see Model H's total prot H = Hi +
Hj = 
C in Model C. Assuming the parameter values ensure an interior solution,
the equilibrium decision of the supplier in region i can be described as follows.
Lemma 6.3 There exists a unique equilibrium capacity fSi; Sjg in Model H which is
determined by the following conditions:
Fi(Si) = m  cf=v +
pHij   ct   cv
v
ij(Si; Sj) 
r + cu   pHji
v
ij(Sj; Sj) (6.6)
We assume fpHij ; pHjig are stable equilibrium prices negotiated by the two regional
suppliers after deliberate consideration and properly reect each supplier's market
power. We nd that there exists a pair of fpHij ; pHjig which coordinate the system and
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drive the two suppliers' decisions achieve the global optimum, as the following lemma
shows.
Lemma 6.4 The system is coordinated when fpHij ; pHjig satisfy the following condition:
pHij =
ij ji(r + cu)  ij( ji(r + cu   ct   cv) + ji(ct + cv))
ij ji   ij ji
: (6.7)
And then the equilibrium decisions fSi; Sjg are the same as in Model C (Lemma 6.1),
and will also be an interior solution giving the same assumptions of parameter values
in Model C. Please see Rudi et al. (2001) and Hu et al. (2007) for more discusses on
the coordinating transmission prices in a horizontally decentralized scenario. Hereby
we emphasize the property that the best performance of Model H is equivalent to the
centralized model, and it bridges between the centralized structure and the other two
structures: the decentralized model and the coordination model.
6.1.4 Decentralized Model
The decentralized model (Model D) serves as a baseline case that the four suppliers
operate independently. Bi(Bj) sells backup power to Gi(Gj) at a wholesale price w,
and the transmission prices between Bi and Bj are fpDij ; pDjig, where pDij is the price Bi
charges to Bj and vice versa. The amount of revenue Gi gains from selling electricity
is (r w)(
mP
t=1
min(xti; Si) + Tji) and B's revenue is (w  cv)(
mP
t=1
min(xti; Si) + Tji). We
assume all suppliers' margins are positive, that is r > w > cv. Bi decides Si to
maximize its prot as follows, with the feasibility constraint Si  0.
DBi(Si; Sj) = Ef(w cv)
mX
t=1
min(xti; Si)+(p
D
ij ct cv)Tij+(w pDji)Tjig cfSi: (6.8)
Gi is not a decision maker and its prot is
DGi = Ri   cu( Di   Ef
mX
t=1
min(xti; Si) + Tjig):
The system prot of decentralized model takes the same form as in the centralized
model shown in Equation 6.1. Assuming the parameter values ensure an interior
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solution, the equilibrium decision of the supplier in region i can be described as
follows.
Lemma 6.5 There exists a unique equilibrium capacity fSi; Sjg in Model D which is
determined by the following conditions:
Fi(Si) = m  cf
w   cv +
pDij   ct   cv
w   cv
ij(Si; Sj) 
r + cu   pDji
w   cv ij(Sj; Sj) (6.9)
The optimal transmission prices fpDij ; pDjig are:
pDij =
ij jiw   ij( ji(w   ct   cv) + ji(ct + cv))
ij ji   ij ji
Similar to the analysis for the decentralized model in Chapter 5, to ensure an interior
solution, the wholesale price w needs to be large enough such that the right hand
side of Equation (6.9) is greater than zero. Notice the above condition is similar to
Model H with the only dierence to replace r+cv with w. An intuitive explanation is,
though the backup power should have a unit value of r + cu from the entire system's
point of view, the decentralized backup power suppliers would only evaluate it as w,
which is an underestimation and leads to the following result.
Lemma 6.6 Under the decentralized model, the total backup capacity ST in the two
regions is less than the global optimum as under the centralized model. ST decreases
when the wholesale price w decreases.
This property reveals that the decentralized model leads to an under investment of
the backup capacity, and if the wholesale price decreases such under investment will
be worse. The system prot in this baseline case is less than in the centralized model.
It is because in the decentralized model the conventional suppliers only concern their
own prots without considering the renewable suppliers' shortage cost. On the other
hand, the renewable suppliers do not oer any incentive to share the risk of investing
on the backup capacity with the conventional suppliers.
62
6.1.5 Coordination Model
We design a coordination contract (Model P) aiming to provide an incentive for the
conventional suppliers to prepare enough backup capacity to the renewable suppliers.
The contract is established on top of the backup power transactions from Bi(Bj) to
Gi(Gj) with a wholesale price w, and the interregional transmission between Bi and
Bj with a pair of transmission prices fpij; pjig, where pij is the price Bi charges to
Bj and vice versa. Gi and Gj set a coordination parameter  which determines a
free TGC oering rate and a local transmission premium, and a pair of interregional
transmission premiums fij; jig.
Firstly, the quantity of free TGC that Gi oers to Bi is cfSi, where Si is the
backup capacity prepared by Bi. In this research we assume each renewable supplier
generates sucient TGC to oer and sells the rest in the national TGC market.
Secondly, though for the locally generated backup power Gi just pays the wholesale
price w to Bi, for the transmitted power Gi will pay w+ct to Bi, where ct is a local
transmission premium. Notice Bi will send a portion of this payment w + ct to Bj
as pji. Lastly, for the transmitted power Gi will also pay an interregional premium
ji to Gj, because Gj contributes to the preparation of backup capacity in region j
by oering TGC to Bj. Notice all suppliers can easily monitor how much power is
transmitted per period because they know the quantity of power shortage and the
maximal backup capacity in each region. Please see Figure 6.1 for the timeline of the
contract.
The coordination model is shown in Figure 6.2. The contract denes a Stackelberg
game where the sequence of events is as follows.
Stage 1: Gi and Gj set the coordination parameter  and the transmission premiums
fij; ji; g; Bi and Bj set the transmission prices fpij; pjig.
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Figure 6.1: Timeline of the Coordination Contract
Stage 2: Bi(Bj) prepares the backup capacity Si(Sj).
The prot functions of the suppliers in the coordination model are as follows.
Figure 6.2: The Market Structure of Coordination Contract
8>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>:
Gi(Si; Sj) = Ef(r + cu   w)
mX
t=1
min(xti; Si) + (r + cu   w   ct   ji)Tji + ijTijg
  cfSi +Ri   cu Di
Bi(Si; Sj) = Ef(w   cv)
mX
t=1
min(xti; Si) + (pij   cv   ct)Tij + (w + ct   pji)Tjig
  (1  )cfSi
(6.10)
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6.2 Analytical Results
In this section we rstly perform the coordination analysis to show that the coordina-
tion contract drives the conventional suppliers prepare backup capacity at the global
optimal level. Then we perform the sensitivity analysis to reveal more properties of
the coordination model.
6.2.1 Coordination Analysis
Theorem 6.1 The coordination model has the following properties.
 The system achieves coordination when the parameters (; ij; pij; ) satisfy the
following conditions: 8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
 =
r + cu   w
r + cu   cv
ij = p
H
ij   (cv + ct)
pij = (1  )pHij + (cv + ct)
 = 
(6.11)
where pHij =
ij ji(r + cu)  ij( ji(r + cu   ct   cv) + ji(ct + cv))
ij ji   ij ji
.
 When the system is coordinated, there exists a unique global optimal solution
of backup capacities which simultaneously maximizes the system prot and the
prot of each supplier. The solution is the same as in the centralized model
(Equation 6.2).
The coordination property is based on the design of the coordination mechanism.
By oering free TGC and paying transmission premiums, the renewable suppliers
share a portion of the system risk with the conventional suppliers which encourages
the latter investing on the backup capacity at the global optimal level. To intuitively
explain the coordination conditions specied in Theorem 6.1, let us compare the prot
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functions with Model H. When f; ij; pij; gmeet the coordination conditions dened
in Equation 6.11, we have8>><>>:
Gi(Si; Sj) = 
H
i (Si; Sj) + (1  )(Ri   cu Di)
Bi(Si; Sj) = (1  )Hi (Si; Sj)  (1  )(Ri   cu Di)
where Hi is the prot of region i in Model H. Then there exists a global opti-
mal fSi; Sjg to simultaneously maximize fHi ;Gi ;Big. From Lemma 6.4 we know
Model H has the same solution of capacities fSi; Sjg and the same system prot as
the centralized model. Therefore, the optimal capacity in the coordination model
reaches the global optimum as described in the centralized model (Equation 6.2).
6.2.2 Prot Split Among The Players
Please see Table 6.1 which shows that when the system is coordinated, for one unit of
power transmitted from region i to j, how the prot is split among the four suppliers.
Total unit revenue (r + cu   cv   ct)
Region i (pHij   cv   ct) Region j (r + cu   pHij )
Bi Gi Bj Gj
(1  )(pHij   cv   ct) (pHij   cv   ct) (1  )(r + cu   pHij ) (r + cu   pHij )
Table 6.1: The Prot Split between Suppliers in a Coordinated System
Besides the payment structure dened in Model P, there are also other equivalent
forms of payment structure to achieve coordination, as long as they split the revenue
as indicated in Table 6.1. In Figure 6.3, the left part shows the payment structure
of Model P when one unit of power is transmitted from Bi to Gj through Bj, and
the right part shows an alternative structure where Bi's power is directly transmitted
to Gj. In the alternative structure, rstly Gj pays w + ct + ij to Bi (receiver to
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sender), then Bi shares ij to Gi and w + ct   pij to Bj. Gi gets a portion of the
prot because it oers TGC as part of the investment for Bi's capacity. For the prot
sharing between Bi and Bj, it can be viewed as that they co-invest on the capacities
in the two regions, and then share the prot generated in each region in a coordinated
manner, such that the investments in their respective regions will be driven to the
global optimal level. The alternative form is suitable for regions where Bi(Bj) has
direct connection through power grids to Gj(Gj). It is equivalent to Model P, and
thus also achieves coordination.
Figure 6.3: An Alternative Coordination Payment Structure
6.2.3 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we examine the impacts of market conditions on the suppliers' deci-
sions and their prots in the coordination model. We consider the following market
conditions: the electricity price (r), the shortage cost (cu), the variable cost (cv), the
capacity cost (cf ), and the transmission cost (ct). Then we consider their impacts on
the following decisions and prots: the TGC oering rate from the renewable suppli-
ers to the conventional suppliers (), the total capacity (ST ) or the capacity in region
i (Si) if applicable, the renewable suppliers' prots (G = Gi + Gj), the conven-
tional suppliers' prots (B = Bi +Bj), and the total prot (
C = G+B). For
those decisions not only depending on the market conditions but also on the demand
distributions, such as the transmission prices (pij), since their trends are uncertain
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under a general demand distribution and thus complicate to analyze, we do not in-
clude them here. At the end of this section we summarize the results in Table 6.2.
Impacts on the suppliers' decisions: backup capacity and TGC oering
rate
Proposition 6.1 The impacts of market conditions on the backup capacity and the
TGC oering rate are as follows.
 When the electricity price (r) increases or the shortage cost (cu) increases, both
the TGC oering rate () and the total capacity (ST ) increase.
 When the variable cost (cv) increases, the TGC oering rate () increases but
the total capacity (ST ) decreases.
 When the capacity cost (cf) increases, the TGC oering rate () keeps the same.
The capacity in region i (Si) decreases.
 When the transmission cost (ct) increases, the TGC oering rate () keeps the
same. The capacity in region i (Si) increases (decreases) when ij < (>) ij.
The rst result reveals that when the backup power becomes more valuable, the re-
newable suppliers oer more TGC to encourage the conventional suppliers investing
more on the backup capacities. The second result reveals that higher variable cost
leads to heavier cost burden for the conventional suppliers, and their investments on
the backup capacity decrease. Facing this change, the renewable suppliers will in-
crease the TGC oering rate to encourage the conventional suppliers' investments. In
the third result, higher capacity cost discourages the conventional suppliers' invest-
ments. Though the TGC oering rate keeps the same, the quantity of TGC oered
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by the renewable suppliers increases because it is proportional to the capacity cost.
In the last result when the transmission cost increases, rstly the TGC oering
rate keeps the same because the coordination condition is unaected by the transmis-
sion cost. Secondly, the impact on region i's backup capacity depends on whether this
region is more possible to export or import. As discussed in Section 6.1, ij measures
the probability of export and ij measures the probability of import. If ij < ij
(region i is an \net importer" in the sense of probability), when the transmission cost
increases, the investment on local capacity increases to save the transmission fee; if
ij > ij such that region i is an \net exporter", higher transmission cost discourages
the investment on local capacity.
Impacts on the prots
Proposition 6.2 The impacts of market conditions on the total prot and the sup-
pliers' prots are as follows.
 When the electricity price (r) increases, the variable cost (cv) decreases, the
capacity cost (cf) decreases, or the transmission cost ct decreases, the total prot
(C) increases. Both the renewable suppliers' prots (G) and the conventional
suppliers' prots (B) increase.
 When the shortage cost (cu) increases, the total prot (C) decreases, the re-
newable suppliers' prots (G) decrease but the conventional suppliers' prots
(B) increase.
This result reveals that when there are favorable (unfavorable) changes in most mar-
ket conditions, the system prot increases (deceases) and the suppliers share the
benet (cost). The only exception is when the shortage cost increases, the renewable
suppliers needs more backup capacity to cover the power shortage. Such that they
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oer more TGC to the conventional suppliers (Proposition 6.1), which leads to a de-
crease of the renewable suppliers' prots but an increase of the conventional suppliers'
prots.
The sensitivity analysis results are summarized in Table 6.2.
 ST 
C G B
r " " " " " "
cu " " " # # "
cv " " # # # #
cf " ! # # # #
ct " ! l # # #
Table 6.2: Summary of the Sensitivity Analysis in Chapter 6
6.3 Numerical Analysis
Hereby we perform numerical analysis to illustrate the robustness of the coordina-
tion model, that when the TGC oering rate deviates from the optimal point, the
system prot will not be signicantly impacted. The parameter values presented in
this section are of illustrative purpose and do not refer to a specic market. The
data setting is fcu = 4; r = 2:1; cv = 0:1; cf = 0:9; ct = 4; R = 500g. The demand
functions in region i are a series of normal distribution as fxti  N(ti; ti); t = 1  4g
where f1i = 35; 2i = 45; 3i = 55; 4i = 65; 1i = 2i = 3i = 4i = 10g. The demand
functions in region j are fxtj  N(tj; tj); t = 1  4g where f1j = 38; 2j = 46; 3j =
54; 4j = 62; 
1
j = 
2
j = 
3
j = 
4
j = 10g. We perform a Monte Carlo simulation in
Matlab to generate 1000 scenarios based on the above distributions and each scenario
is equally weighted.
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Due to the complexity nature of power markets with renewable penetration, it is
dicult to accurately estimate and predict all market conditions. Thus the renewable
suppliers may not make a perfect TGC oering rate  at its optimal point which is
0:783 given the above parameters. To study the impacts of inaccurate TGC oering
rate on the total prot, we allow an error of 15% of the optimal point (0:666  0:9).
We nd that the performance of the coordination model is robust. As shown in Figure
6.4, even when  deviates from the optimal point to 15%, the total prot loss of
coordination model is only up to 6.7% (the percentage is calculated as (343 320)=343,
after dropping the basic revenue R = 500). The reduced prot 820 is still higher than
the best performance of decentralized model at 730:7 (achieved by xing w = r such
that the double marginalization is eliminated).
Figure 6.4: Robustness of the Coordination Contract
6.4 Summary of Chapter 6
This chapter studies a coordination framework between renewable suppliers and con-
ventional suppliers in regional electricity markets with interregional power transmis-
sion. The energy sources of the renewable suppliers are intermittent and lead to
random power shortage. To encourage the conventional suppliers to prepare enough
backup capacities to cover the shortage, we design a coordination mechanism as fol-
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lows. The renewable suppliers oer free tradable green certicates and deposit them
into a pool. The conventional suppliers withdraw from the pool based on their con-
tributions in the preparation of backup capacities. The renewable suppliers decide
their respective TGC oering rates, and the conventional suppliers decide the power
transmission prices and then the quantities of backup capacities.
We solve the close-form solution of this coordination model, and prove that the
contract achieves the system coordination. We study a baseline case without coordi-
nation and prove the baseline case leads to under investment of the backup capacity,
and the system prot of the baseline case is less than the coordination model. We
show the coordination mechanism is robust, that if the TGC oering rate deviates
from the optimal point, the system prot will not decrease signicantly.
We conduct sensitivity analysis to nd the impacts of following market conditions.
Firstly, when the electricity price increases, both the total capacity and the TGC
oering rate increase. All suppliers' prots and the system prot increase. Secondly,
when the shortage cost increases, both the total capacity and the TGC oering rate
increase. The system prot and the renewable suppliers' prots decrease, but the
conventional suppliers' prots increase. Thirdly, when the capacity cost increases,
the capacity in each region decreases while the TGC oering rate keeps the same.
All suppliers' prots and the system prot decrease. Fourthly, when the variable
cost increases, the total capacity decreases while the TGC oering rate increases. All
suppliers' prots and the system prot decrease. Lastly, When the transmission cost
increases, the TGC oering rate keeps the same. The capacity in a region increases
(decreases) if this region is more possible to import (export) backup power. All
suppliers' prots and the system prot decrease.
72
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS
This dissertation studies impacts of RPS regulation on regional electricity markets
and rms' coordination behavior facing RPS regulation. Our research eorts can be
divided into the following three parts.
Firstly, we establish analytical models for a monopoly market and a duopoly mar-
ket. We solve the models and analyze the impacts of TGC price and RPS percentage
on the green/black energy outputs, the electricity price and the suppliers' prot. We
reveal that the increase of local RPS percentage may not guarantee an increase of
local green output. Our analytical results indicate that the green power output de-
creases when the RPS percentage increases in the regional electricity market if the
TGC price in the national market remains unchanged. In contrast, a higher TGC
price can eectively promote the local green power output. A collective eort of in-
creasing RPS percentage by many regions increases the overall demand of TGC across
the country, and the national TGC price will increase. In summary, we suggest the
regional regulators to set up their RPS development plans carefully in a synchronized
way.
We compare the dierence between two structures with numerical analysis. In
the duopoly structure, the electricity price and suppliers' prots are lower, and the
total electricity supply is higher than in the monopoly structure. The electricity
outputs change slower when the TGC price increases in the duopoly structure than
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in the monopoly structure. The monopoly supplier only needs to pay attention to
cost reduction and can respond rapidly; while the suppliers in the duopoly structure
need to be concerned with both cost reduction and keeping their market shares. To
maximize the social welfare, the optimal RPS percentage in the duopoly structure is
higher than in the monopoly structure.
Secondly, we study a coordination contract based on TGC oering between a re-
newable supplier and a conventional supplier in a single region market. The energy
sources of the renewable suppliers are intermittent and lead to random power short-
age. To encourage the conventional supplier to build backup capacity to cover the
shortage, we design a coordination contract where the renewable supplier oers the
conventional supplier free tradable green certicate proportional to the backup ca-
pacity. The renewable supplier decides the TGC oering rate and the wholesale price
of backup power, and then the conventional supplier decides the quantity of backup
capacity. We prove the contract achieves the system coordination. The system prot
can be arbitrarily allocated between the two suppliers by adjusting the wholesale
price. We study a baseline case without coordination and prove the baseline case
leads to under investment of the backup capacity. By comparing to the baseline case,
we nd the coordination model can achieve Pareto improvement for both suppliers.
Sensitivity analysis is conducted on the impacts of following market conditions.
Firstly, when the xed cost increases, the backup capacity decreases and the TGC
oering rate increases. Both suppliers' prots decrease and the total prot decreases.
Secondly, when the electricity price increases or the variable cost decreases, the backup
capacity increases and the TGC oering rate decreases. Both suppliers' prots in-
crease and the total prot increases. Lastly, when the shortage cost increases, the
backup capacity increases and the TGC oering rate increases. The total prot de-
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creases, the renewable supplier's prot decreases but the conventional supplier's prot
increases. Social welfare analysis is conducted, and we nd that the social welfare of
the coordination structure will be greater than of the baseline case unless the envi-
ronmental damage of conventional power is extremely high.
Thirdly, we study a capacity coordination mechanism based on TGC oering and
transmission premium in a two-region market with interregional transmission. The
renewable suppliers oer free tradable green certicates and pay transmission premi-
ums to encourage the conventional suppliers to prepare enough backup capacity. The
renewable suppliers decide the TGC oering rates and the transmission premiums,
and the conventional suppliers decide the power transmission prices and then the
quantities of backup capacities. We prove the above mechanism achieves the system
coordination. We study a baseline case without coordination and prove the baseline
case leads to under investment of the backup capacity, and the system prot of the
baseline case is less than the coordination model. We show the coordination mech-
anism is robust, that if the TGC oering rate deviates from the optimal point, the
system prot will not decrease signicantly.
We conduct sensitivity analysis to nd the impacts of following market conditions.
Firstly, when the electricity price increases, both the total capacity and the TGC
oering rate increase. All suppliers' prots and the system prot increase. Secondly,
when the shortage cost increases, both the total capacity and the TGC oering rate
increase. The system prot and the renewable suppliers' prots decrease, but the
conventional suppliers' prots increase. Thirdly, when the xed cost increases, the
capacity in each region decreases while the TGC oering rate keeps the same. All
suppliers' prots and the system prot decrease. Fourthly, when the variable cost
increases, the total capacity decreases while the TGC oering rate increases. All
75
suppliers' prots and the system prot decrease. Lastly, When the transmission cost
increases, the TGC oering rate keeps the same. The capacity in a region increases
(decreases) if this region is more possible to import (export) backup power. All
suppliers' prots and the system prot decrease.
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS
Proof of Lemma 4.1
Proof. The monopoly supplier's prot function is twice dierentiable as follows:
(SB; SG) = [
  SB   SG

(SB + SG)]  [cB(SB) + cTSB]  [cG(SG)  (1  )cTSG].
At its local maximum the rst order derivatives equal to zero:8>><>>:
@
@SB
=
  2SB   2SG

  c0B(SB)  cT = 0
@
@SG
=
  2SB   2SG

  c0G(SG) + (1  )cT = 0
According to Bertsekas (1999), to ensure the strict concavity of (SB; SG) such
that its local maximum is the unique global maximum, the Hessian matrix of (SB; SG)
should be negative denite. This is equivalent to the following conditions:8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
2c00B + 2c
00
G + c
00
Bc
00
G > 0
c00B >  2=
c00G >  2=
Given c00B=G > 0, the above conditions are satised.
Proof of Lemma 4.2
Proof. The black supplier's payo function is twice dierentiable as follows:
B(SB) =
  SB   SG

SB   cB(SB)  cTSB.
The green supplier's payo function is twice dierentiable as follows:
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G(SG) =
  SB   SG

SG   cG(SG) + (1  )cTSG.
According to Theorem 2 of Rosen (1965), the payo functions fB;Gg need to
be diagonally strictly concave to ensure the existence of unique Nash equilibrium. Let
~S = (SB; SG)
T and ~ = (B;G)
T . With the notations of our model, ~ is diagonally
strictly concave for every ~S 2 R, if for every ~S0 2 R and a dierent ~S1 2 R we have
(~S1   ~S0)Tr~(~S0) + (~S0   ~S1)Tr~(~S1) > 0
A sucient condition to ensure diagonally strictly concavity can be built as follows.
Let J be the Jacobian of payo functions fB;Gg, we have:
J =
264  2=   c00B(SB)  1=
 1=  2=   c00G(SG)
375
It is easy to verify J + JT is negative denite. According to Theorem 6 of Rosen
(1965), the payo functions are diagonally strictly concave. And then a unique Nash
equilibrium exists.
Proof of Proposition 4.1
Proof. From equation (4.4) we have the close-form solution of fSB; SGg in the
monopoly market. The electricity price p and the monopoly supplier's prot  can
be derived from fSB; SGg. Take a derivative on  for fp;; SB; SGg, we have
@p
@
> 0;
@
@
< 0;
@SB
@
< 0;
@SG
@
< 0
8 2 R, given the assumptions for other parameter values hold. For example,
@p
@
=
cT (b2 + g2)
2(g2 + b2(1 + g2))
:
Then given the assumptions of fcT ; b2; g2; g > 0 specied in the model description,
@p
@
> 0 8 2 R.
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From equation 4.5, we analyze the impact of  in the duopoly market and have similar
results.
Proof of Proposition 4.2
Proof. For both market structures, take a derivative on cT for fSB; SGg, we have
@SB=@cT < 0 and @SG=@cT > 0, 8cT 2 R, given the assumptions for other parameter
values hold.
.
For the monopoly structure, take a derivative on cT for the total prot :
@
@cT
=
cT   g1 + ( 1 + )b2( + ( 1 + )cT + g1)  g2 + 2cTg2 + b1(1 + g2)
2(g2 + b2(1 + g2))
.
Let
cTM =
g2   (1  )b2 + g1 + (1  )b2g1   b1(1 + g2)
1 + (1  )2b2 + 2g2
denote the threshold. When cT < cTM , @=@cT < 0. When cT > cTM , @=@cT > 0.
That is, when cT increases, the prot rst decreases then increases.
For the duopoly structure, take a derivative on cT for the total prot, and a similar
threshold cTN can be found.
By taking a derivative on cT for the black/green suppliers' prots B=G, we have
@B=@cT < 0 and @G=@cT > 0, 8cT 2 R, given the assumptions for other parameter
values hold.
For the monopoly structure, take a derivative on cT for the electricity price p:
@p
@cT
=
( 1 + )b2 + g2
2(g2 + b2(1 + g2))
:
When  < M = b2=(b2 + g2), @p=@cT < 0. When  > M , @p=@cT > 0.
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For the duopoly structure, take a derivative on cT for the electricity price, and a
similar threshold N can be found.
Proof of Proposition 4.3
Proof. For the monopoly model, rstly we substitute the optimal fSB; SGg from
equation (4.4) into the social welfare function. Then we take the second order deriva-
tive of social welfare W on , and have the follows.
@2W
@2
=  c
2
T (g
2
2 + b
2
2(1 + 2g2) + 2b2g2(1 + g2B))
4(g2 + b2(1 + g2))2
< 0
It is easy to see W is quadratic and concave on , thus the unique optimal  exist.
Using the rst order condition and solve @W=@ = 0, we can get the optimal .
The solving of optimal  in the duopoly model is similar and thus omitted.
Proof of Theorem 5.1
Proof.
The Stackelberg game proceeds in two stages. In stage one G decides the TGC oer-
ing rate  and the wholesale price w to coordinate the system. In stage two B decides
the backup capacity S to maximize its prot, which also maximizes G's prot and
the system prot when the system is coordinated.
1) G decides  and w:
From Equation (5.1), (5.3), and (5.4), when

cf
=
r   w + cu
r   cv + cu , we have8>><>>:
G(S) = aC(S)  b
B(S) = (1  a)C(S) + b
where a =

cf
=
r   w + cu
r   cv + cu and b = (1  a)cu
D. Then there exists a global optimal
S to maximize fC(S);G(S);B(S)g simultaneously, and the system is coordinated.
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2) B decides S:
As shown in Equation (5.3), B's prot function is
B(S) = (   cf )S + (w   cv)Y (S)
Take a derivative on S we have
@B
@S
=    cf + (w   cv)(m 
mX
t=1
Ft(S))
where Ft(:) is the c.d.f. of the random demand at period t. Let F (:) =
mP
t=1
Ft(:). It
is easy to see @B=@S monotonically decreases on S and then B is concave on S.
Applying the rst order condition @B=@S = 0, we have the optimal capacity S for
B as
F (S) = m  cf   
w   cv :
Substituting the coordination condition  = cf
r   w + cu
r   cv + cu into the above expression,
we have the optimal capacity SP as
F (SP ) = m  cf
r   cv + cu :
To verify SP is also the global optimum, we consider the total prot function
shown in Equation (5.1) which is
C(S) = R  cu D + (r   cv + cu)Y (S)  cfS
Applying the rst order condition @C=@S = 0, we get the same SP .
The wholesale price w
Hereby we prove the system prot can be arbitrarily allocated between the two sup-
pliers by adjusting the wholesale price w. The system prot C keeps constant at
the global optimum when  is bound with w as Theorem 5.1 shows. Notice we keep
the assumption r > w > cv which denes the lower bound and upper bound of w.
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Firstly by taking  = cf
r   w + cu
r   cv + cu we can write B as
B = (w   cv)Y (S)  cfS w   cv
r   cv + cu = (w   cv)(Y (S) 
cfS
r   cv + cu ):
Since B > 0, we have
@B
@w
= Y (S)  cfS
r   cv + cu > 0:
Secondly, when w = cv (lower bound) it is easy to see B = 0 and G = C ;
when w = r (upper bound) we have
G =   cu
r   cv + cu cf   cu(
D   Y (S)) < 0;
and then B = C   G > C :
In summary, when w increases from the lower bound to the upper bound, B
monotonically increases from 0 to a value greater than C , which means the system
prot can be arbitrarily allocated between the two suppliers.
Proof of Proposition 5.1
Proof.
From Theorem 5.1 we have the close-form solution of optimal fS; g in the coordi-
nation model. Take a derivative on fcf ; r; cv; cug, and notice that when we take the
derivative on a certain parameter, the assumptions for other parameter values hold.
We nd
@S
@cf
< 0;
@
@cf
> 0;8cf 2 R;
@S
@cv
< 0;
@
@cv
> 0;8cv 2 R;
@S
@r
> 0;
@
@r
> 0;8r 2 R;
@S
@cu
> 0;
@
@cu
> 0; 8cu 2 R:
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Proof of Proposition 5.2
Proof.
For the convenience of proving, we may use  directly or its close-form solution
 = cf
r   w + cu
r   cv + cu . Notice that when we take the derivative on a certain parame-
ter, the assumptions for other parameter values hold.
Impact of cf
Take a derivative on cf for G, we have
@G
@cf
=   @
@cf
S < 0;8cf 2 R, for we know
@
@cf
> 0 from proposition 5.1.
Take a derivative on cf for B, we have
@B
@cf
=   w   cv
r   cv + cuS < 0; 8cf 2 R.
Since C = G +B, we have
@C
@cf
< 0;8cf 2 R.
Impact of cv
@G
@cv
=   @
@cv
S < 0;8cv 2 R, for we know @
@cv
> 0 from proposition 5.1.
Take a derivative on cv for B, we have
@B
@cv
= cfS
r   w + cu
(r   cv + cu)2   Y (S):
Since B = (w   cv)Y (S) + (   cf )S = (w   cv)Y (S)  cfS w   cv
r   cv + cu > 0, we have
Y (S) > cfS
1
r   cv + cu > cfS
1
r   cv + cu
r   w + cu
r   cv + cu ;
then it can be seen that
@B
@cv
< 0;8cv 2 R.
Since C = G +B, we have
@C
@cv
< 0;8cv 2 R.
Impact of r
@G
@r
= Y (S)  cfS w   cv
(r   cv + cu)2 . From above we have
Y (S) > cfS
1
r   cv + cu > cfS
1
r   cv + cu
w   cv
r   cv + cu ;
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then it can be seen that
@G
@r
> 0;8r 2 R.
@B
@r
= cfS
w   cv
(r   cv + cu)2 > 0; 8r 2 R.
Since C = G +B, we have
@C
@r
> 0;8r 2 R.
Impact of cu
@G
@cu
=   @
@cu
S   ( D   Y (S)) < 0;8cu 2 R, for we know @
@cu
> 0 from proposition
5.1.
@B
@cu
= cfS
w   cv
(r   cv + cu)2 > 0; 8cu 2 R.
@C
@cu
=  ( D   Y (S)) < 0; 8cu 2 R.
Proof of Proposition 5.3
Proof.
The social welfare is
W = Y (S)U   cu( D   Y (S))  cfS
where U = u  e  cv.
Applying the rst order condition @W=@S = 0, we have the optimal capacity SW to
maximize the social welfare as
SW = F
 1(m  cf
U + cu
) = F 1(m  cf
u  e  cv + cu ):
Proof of Proposition 5.4
Proof.
From proposition 5.3 we have the close-form solution of optimal SW . Take a derivative
on e we nd
@SW
@e
< 0;8e 2 R, given the assumptions for other parameter values hold.
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Notice SP = F
 1(m  cf
r   cv + cu ) and SD = F
 1(m  cf
r   cv ), it is easy to see
SD < SP  SW when e  u  r; SW  SD < SP when e  u  r+ cu; SD < SW < SP
when u  r < e < u  r + cu.
Proof of Lemma 6.1
Proof.
As shown in Equation (6.1), the total prot function is
C(Si; Sj) =Ri +Rj   cu( Di + Dj)  cf (Si + Sj)
+ Efv
mX
t=1
(min(xti; Si) + min(x
t
j; Sj)) + (v   ct)(Tij + Tji)g:
Notice that @Efmin(xti; Si)g=@Si = 1  F ti = 1  Prfxti < Sig; @EfT tijg=@Si = tij =
Prfxtj   Sj > Si   xti > 0g; @EfT tjig=@Si =  tij =  PrfSj   xtj > xti   Si > 0g.
Take a derivative of C on Si, we have
@C
@Si
= v(m  Fi) + (v   ct)( ij   ij)  cf = 0;
where Fi =
mP
t=1
F ti ,
ij =
mP
t=1
tij, and ij =
mP
t=1
tij.
Now we show the concavity of C(Si; Sj), and thus the above rst-order condition
is sucient for optimality. C(Si; Sj) is the summation of the following m per period
prot functions Ct (Si; Sj), plus a constant K = Ri +Rj   cu( Di + Dj):
Ct (Si; Sj) =  (Si + Sj)cf=m+ Efv(Y ti + Y tj ) + (v   ct)(T tij + T tji)g; t = 1  m:
The rst term is the per period capacity cost. Y ti = min(x
t
i; Si), is the local sale
in region i. T tij = min(Z
t
i ;W
t
j ), is the power transmitted from i to j, where Z
t
i =
max(Si   xti; 0) is the power surplus in region i, and W tj = max(xtj   Sj; 0) is the
power shortage in region j. Y tj and T
t
ji = min(Z
t
j ;W
t
i ) have similar economical mean-
ings.
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The optimization problem expressed by Ct (Si; Sj) can be reformulated as a two-
stage stochastic programming problem as follows.
Max Ct (Si; Sj) =  (Si+Sj)cf=m+Efv(Y ti + Y tj ) + (v  ct)(T tij + T tji) M(Zti +
W ti + Z
t
j +W
t
j )g
s.t. Si  0; Sj  0;
Y ti  xti; Y ti  Si; Yi  0;
Y tj  xtj; Y tj  Sj; Yj  0;
T tij  0; T tij  Zi; T tij  Wj; Zi  Si   xti;Wj  xtj   Sj;
T tji  0; T tji  Zj; T tji  Wi; Zj  Sj   xtj;Wi  xti   Si.
fxti; xtjg are non-negative random variables dened in a convex probability space.
fSi; Sjg are the rst stage decision variables. fY ti ; Y tj ; T tij; T tjig and fZti ;W ti ; Zti ;W ti g
are the second stage decision variables. Notice fZti ;W ti ; Zti ;W ti g are articial variables
and M is a large enough positive parameter.
According to Slyke and Wets (1966), since the operators are all linear and the
feasible regions of the decision variables are all convex, the above two-stage stochastic
programming problem is concave in fSi; Sjg. Then C(Si; Sj) is also concave as the
summation of m concave functions Ct (Si; Sj) .
Proof of Lemma 6.2
Proof.
By using the rst order condition @Ni (Si)=@Si = 0, we can nd the unique global
optimal solution of backup capacity SNi to maximize the centralized rm's prot as
Fi(S
N
i ) = m  cf=v:
Notice (r + cu   cv)mS  v
mP
t=1
min(xt; S) > cfS, such that m   cf=v > 0. Also
it is easy to verify that Fi(0) = 0 and Fi(Si) monotonically increases on Si. Then
SNi > 0 is an interior solution.
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By using the second order condition , we have @2Ni (Si)=@S
2
i =  v
mP
t=1
ft(:) < 0.
Such that Ni is strictly concave and the rst order condition denes the unique global
optimal solution of backup capacity SNi .
Comparing Equation 6.2 and 6.4, we have Fi(Si) Fi(SNi ) = (1 ct=v)( ij(Si; Sj) 
ij(Sj; Sj)). Notice Fi(:) is a monotonically increasing function and 1  ct=v > 0. It
is easy to see SNi > (<)Si if
ij > (<) ij.
Proof of Lemma 6.3
Proof.
The Nash equilibrium is given by the rst order conditions as Equation 6.6 shows.
To establish the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium, it is sucient to show that
the reaction functions are monotonic, and the absolute value of the slop is less than
1 (see Proposition 1 of Rudi et al. (2001)). For this purpose, we show @Si=@Sj < 0
and  @Si=@Sj < 1 as follows.
We dene the following marginal probabilities:8>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
at = fxti(Si)
bt1 = Prfxti < Sigfxti+xtj jxti<Si(Si + Sj)
bt2 = Prfxti + xtj > Si + Sjgfxtijxti+xtj>Si+Sj(Si)
gt1 = Prfxti > Sigfxti+xtj jxti>Si(Si + Sj)
gt2 = Prfxti + xtj < Si + Sjgfxtijxti+xtj<Si+Sj(Si)
Such that @F ti =@Si = a
t, @F ti =@Sj = 0, @
t
ij=@Si =  bt1 + bt2, @tij=@Sj =  bt1,
@tij=@Si = g
t
1   gt2, @tij=@Sj = gt1. Please notice at = bt2 + gt2.
Take a total derivative of Equation 6.6 on Sj, we have
 va@Si=@Sj+(pHij ct cv)[( b1+b2)@Si=@Sj b1] (r+cu pHji)[(g1 g2)@Si=@Sj+g1] = 0;
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where a =
mP
t=1
at, b1 =
mP
t=1
bt1, b2 =
mP
t=1
bt2, g1 =
mP
t=1
gt1, g2 =
mP
t=1
gt2. Please notice
v = r + cu   ct. Rearranging the above and we have
 @Si
@Sj
=
(pHij   ct   cv)b1 + (r + cu   pHji)g1
va+ (pHij   ct   cv)(b1   b2) + (r + cu   pHji)(g1   g2)
:
Given the assumption ct + cv < p
H
ij (p
H
ji) < r + cu, it is easy to see the numerator of
the above function is positive. Additionally, given a = b2+g2, it is easy to verify that
va > (pHij   ct  cv)b2+(r+ cu  pHji)g2, and then the denominator is greater than the
numerator. Then we have  @Si=@Sj < 1 and @Si=@Sj < 0.
Proof of Lemma 6.4
Proof.
To nd the coordinating transmission prices, it is sucient to nd a pair of fpHij ; pHjig
which induce the rms to choose the global optimal capacity fSi; Sjg. By equating
the right side of Equation 6.2 and 6.6, we can form two linear equations with two
variables fpHij ; pHjig. Solving them yields the unique coordinating transmission prices
as Equation 6.7 shows.
Proof of Lemma 6.5
Proof.
Compare the prot function of conventional supplier Bi in Model D (
D
Bi
in Equation
6.8) with the prot function of regional supplier i in Model H (Hi in Equation 6.5),
it is easy to see DBi is just to replace r+ cu in 
H
i with w, and then minus a constant
Ki = Ri   cu Di. Following the same process of Lemma 6.3 and 6.4, we can nd the
unique Nash equilibrium and the coordinating transmission prices in Model D, which
are to replace r + cu with w in Equation 6.6 and 6.7.
Proof of Lemma 6.6
Proof.
Lemma 6.5 shows that the capacity fSi; Sjg in Model D is to replace v with w   cu
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in the capacity in Model H, which is the same as the capacity in Model C (Lemma
6.4). To prove the total capacity ST = Si + Sj in Model D is less than in Model C,
we only need to prove @ST=@v > 0 in Model C, since w   cu < v. Then it is natural
that ST in Model D decreases when w decrease.
Now consider the total prot function C(v; Si; Sj) as shown in Equation 6.1. By
the Implicit Function Theorem, we have
@Si
@v
=
(@2C=@Si@Sj)(@
2C=@Si@v)  (@2C=@S2i )(@2C=@Sj@v)
 jHj ;
where H is the Hessian matrix of C(Si; Sj). Notice  jHj > 0 since C(Si; Sj) is
concave as shown by Lemma 6.1. Now consider
@ST
@v
=
(@2C=@Si@v)[(@
2C=@Si@Sj)  (@2C=@S2j )] + (@2C=@Sj@v)[(@2C=@Si@Sj)  (@2C=@S2i )]
 jHj :
Using the notations fFi; ij; ijg dened in Lemma 6.1 and fa; b1; b2; g1; g2g dened
in Lemma 6.3, we have (A) @2C=@Si@v = 1 Fi  ij+ ij > 0; (B) @2C=@Si@Sj 
@2C=@S2i = (v   ct)( b1   g1)   [(v   ct)( b1 + b2   g1 + g2)   va] = cta > 0.
By exchanging i with j in the above two conditions, we have (C) @2C=@Sj@v > 0
and (D) @2C=@Sj@Si   @2C=@S2j > 0. Based on conditions (A) to (D), we have
@ST=@v > 0.
Proof of Theorem 6.1
Proof.
The coordination contract can be considered as two parts: (1) Gi(Gj) oers a certain
amount of TGC and pays transmission premiums to share the system cost; (2) Bi(Bj)
receives the TGC oering and the transmission premium, and transmits power based
on a pair of transmission prices. Given the contract parameters in Theorem 6.1, we
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show that the system is coordinated as follows.
Gi(Gj)'s prot
From Equation (6.5), (6.10), and (6.11), substitute ij = p
H
ij   (cv + ct) into Gi .
Notice Hi = Gi +Bi and p
H
ji = pij + ij. We have
Gi = Ef(pHij   ct   cv)Tij + (r + cu   pHji)Tji + v
mX
t=1
min(xti; Si)g   cfSi +Ri   cu Di
= Hi (Si; Sj) + (1  )(Ri   cu Di)
Then there exists a same solution of capacities fSi; Sjg to maximize Hi (Si; Sj) and
Gi(Si; Sj) simultaneously.
Bi(Bj)'s prot
From Equation (6.5), (6.10), and (6.11), substitute pij = (1  )pHij + (cv + ct) into
Bi . We have
Bi = Ef(1  )(pHij   ct   cv)Tij + (1  )(r + cu   pHji)Tji + (1  )v
mX
t=1
min(xti; Si)g
  (1  )cfSi
= (1  )(Hi (Si; Sj)  (Ri   cu Di))
Then there exists a same solution of capacities fSi; Sjg to maximize Hi (Si; Sj) and
Bi(Si; Sj) simultaneously.
From Lemma 6.4 we know Model H (Hi (Si; Sj)) has the same solution of capac-
ities fSi; Sjg and the same system prot as the centralized model. Therefore, the
optimal capacity in the coordination model reaches the global optimum as described
in the centralized model (Equation 6.2).
Proof of Proposition 6.1
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Proof.
From Theorem 6.1 we have  =
r + cu   w
r + cu   cv , which is not aected by cf and ct. Take
a derivative on fr; cv; cug, and notice that when we take the derivative on a certain
parameter, the assumptions for other parameter values hold. We nd
@=@r > 0;8r 2 R; @=@cv > 0;8cv 2 R; @=@cu > 0; 8cu 2 R.
In Lemma 6.6 we have proved @ST=@v > 0, where v = r+ cu  cv. Then it is easy
to see @ST=@r > 0;8r 2 R; @ST=@cu > 0; 8cu 2 R; @ST=@cv < 0;8cv 2 R.
From Equation 6.2 we have the optimal condition of Si:
Fi(Si) = m  cf=v + (1  ct=v)( ij(Si; Sj)  ij(Sj; Sj))
Notice Fi(Si) monotonically increases on Si and vice versa. From @Fi=@cf =  1=v < 0
we have Si decreases on cf . From @Fi=@ct =  ( ij   ij)=v, we have Si increases
(decreases) on ct if ij   ij < (>)0.
Proof of Proposition 6.2
Proof.
For the convenience of proving, we rewrite the three prot functions as follows.8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
C(Si; Sj) = K   cf (Si + Sj) + EfvY + (v   ct)(Tij + Tji)g
G(Si; Sj) = K + Ef(r + cu   w)(Y + Tij + Tji)  ct(Tij + Tji)g   cf (Si + Sj)
B(Si; Sj) = Ef(w   cv)Y + (w   cv   (1  )ct)(Tij + Tji)g   (1  )cf (Si + Sj)
Notice v = r+cu cv,  = (r+cu w)=(r+cu cv), Y =
mP
t=1
(min(xti; Si)+min(x
t
j; Sj))
denoting the locale sale of backup power, and K = Ri + Rj   cu( Di + Dj) denoting
the basic revenue without backup capacity. Also notice when we take the derivative
on a certain parameter, the assumptions for other parameter values hold.
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Impact of r
@C=@r = EfY + Tij + Tjig > 0; 8r 2 R is straightforward.
@B=@r = Efct(Tij + Tji) + cf (Si + Sj)g@=@r > 0;8r 2 R, since @=@r > 0 (Propo-
sition 6.1).
@G=@r = (r + cu   w)[(Y   ST cf=v) + (1   ct=v)(Tij + Tji)] > 0;8r 2 R, from
two assumptions in Section 6.1, v
mP
t=1
min(xti; Si) > cfSi (preparing backup capacity
is protable) and v > ct (interregional transmission is protable).
Impact of cu
@C=@cu =  ( Di + Dj   EfY + Tij + Tjig)  0; 8cu 2 R is straightforward, as the
backup power consumption cannot exceed the total shortage.
@B=@cu = Efct(Tij + Tji) + cf (Si + Sj)g@=@cu > 0; 8cu 2 R, since @=@cu > 0
(Proposition 6.1).
From the above two results and G = 
C   B, we have @G=@cu < 0; 8cu 2 R.
Impact of cv
@C=@cv =  EfY + Tij + Tjig < 0;8cv 2 R is straightforward.
@B=@cv =  EfY +Tij +Tjig Efct(Tij +Tji)+ cf (Si+Sj)g(@=@cv) < 0;8cv 2 R,
since @=@cv > 0 (Proposition 6.1).
@G=@cv =  Efct(Tij + Tji) + cf (Si + Sj)g(@=@cv) < 0; 8cv 2 R.
Impact of cf
@C=@cf =  (Si + Sj) < 0;8cf 2 R.
@B=@cf =  (1  )(Si + Sj) < 0;8cf 2 R.
@G=@cf =  (Si + Sj) < 0; 8cf 2 R.
Impact of ct
100
@C=@ct =  (Tij + Tji) < 0;8ct 2 R.
@B=@ct =  (1  )(Tij + Tji) < 0;8ct 2 R.
@G=@ct =  (Tij + Tji) < 0;8ct 2 R.
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